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FAMILY BUSINESS GOVERNANCE AND
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS: THE CHALLENGES
FACING AN INDEPENDENT FAMILY BUSINESS
BOARD
Carlo Osi*
I.

INTRODUCTION1

The primary purpose of this article is to identify, analyze and decipher
the multifarious challenges of instituting fully independent boards of
directors in family-run2 companies, as well as to prescribe
recommendations for these challenges. As more family businesses are
established in North America, Asia, and other parts of the world, and as
existing family-controlled enterprises are continuously being run and
fortified by enterprising families, there is a constant rethinking on their
business governance structure. Since a great majority of family businesses
do not last beyond the first or second generation if not governed
responsibly, the ultimate question is whether or not strategically placing
independent directors will help empower these close corporations to last
* LL.M. (University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2008); Certificate in Business and
Public Policy (Wharton School, 2008); LL.M. in International Economic and Business Law
(Kyushu University Faculty of Law, Japan, 2006); J.D./Bachelor of Laws (University of the
Philippines, 2002).
1. I express my great appreciation to my Wharton professor on Strategies and
Practices of Family-controlled Companies, Prof. William Alexander, for providing useful
insights and academic guidance during the development of this paper. I also sincerely thank
Mr. Philip Clemens, Chairman and CEO of The Clemens Family Corporation and Hatfield
Quality Meats, for sharing his time and practical wisdom on the independent board of his
family company.
2. “Family-run,” “family-controlled” and “family business” will be used
interchangeably throughout the article. A family-run business is “typically one in which
more than half the shares are controlled by members of the same family, or one that has
been passed between generations.”
Business Link, Family-Run Businesses,
http://www.businesslink.gov.uk/bdotg/action/layer?topicId=1074039321 (last visited Apr.
22, 2008). Family businesses can also be described as “organizations where two or more
extended family members influence the direction of the business through the exercise of
kinship ties, management roles, or ownership rights.” Renato Tagiuri, Working With
Relatives in the Family Firm, HARV. BUS. SCH. Note 9-902-424, Feb. 2002, at 1.
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beyond their expected lifecycles.
One of the basic questions that typically arise relates to whether there
is a need for a board of directors to be established as the main governance
structure. This question is premised on the ominous fact that familycontrolled businesses3 have restricted shares, have no open market for stock
transfers, and may not necessarily be as large as publicly-held companies
(with exceptions, of course). If there is a need for a board of directors,
when should it be established in the history of the entity? Once instituted,
who will populate the board of directors and why? Should all the seats in
the board be occupied by the same family owners or should independent
directors take their seats? Why should independent directors take the seats
of family members who have run and developed the company for decades?
What are the critical functions of independent directors and what do they
bring to the table? Lastly, what should be the board’s recommended
composition (i.e., the configuration between insider and independent
directors), the length of their terms of office, the number of boards (both
family-run and publicly-held corporations) they can adequately serve on
without sacrificing quality and dedication to work, the background of these
independent directors, and compensation? Moreover, Dyer asks, “What
should be the role and function of the board—rubberstamp, advisory,
paper, or overseer?”4
Also known as close corporations,5 family-run enterprises have been
the backbone of industrial development in highly developed countries for a
long period of time. From simple sole proprietorships and “mom-and-pop
shops,”6 to the United States’ 33 of the world’s 100 largest family
businesses,7 the United Kingdom’s centuries-old royal companies,8
3. Family-controlled businesses are described as “businesses, whether public or
private, in which a family controls the largest block of shares or votes and has one or more
of its members in key management positions.” DANNY MILLER & ISABEL LE BRETONMILLER, MANAGING FOR THE LONG RUN: LESSONS IN COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE FROM
GREAT FAMILY BUSINESSES 2 (2005).
4. W. GIBB DYER, JR., CULTURAL CHANGE IN FAMILY FIRMS: ANTICIPATING AND
MANAGING BUSINESS AND FAMILY TRANSITIONS 67 (1986).
5. A close corporation cannot exceed thirty shareholders and is eligible to elect “S”
Corporation status with the IRS. The stockholder has limited disposition of the shares.
Close corporations cannot also make public offerings as defined in the Securities Act of
1933. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342 (2008).
6. DAVID S. LANDES, DYNASTIES: FORTUNES AND MISFORTUNES OF THE WORLD’S
GREAT FAMILY BUSINESSES xi (2006).
7. Jane A. Pearl and Leah Kristie, The World’s Largest Family Businesses:
BUS.
MAG.
Spotlighting
the
Wealthiest
of
the
Wealthy,
FAM.
http://familybusinessmagazine.com/WorldsLargestFBs.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
8. See Leah Kristie, The World’s Oldest Family Companies: Cheers to the Survivors,
FAM. BUS. MAG. http://familybusinessmagazine.com/worldsoldest.html (last visited Oct. 4,
2009) (noting that family businesses have been suppliers of military fabrics for British
troops, builders of royal palaces and residences, clothing retailers and tailors, shipping
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Germany’s family-owned and run small- and medium-sized businesses
known as Mittelstand companies,9 Japan’s family-dominated pre-war
zaibatsu conglomerates,10 and Korea’s family-controlled, governmentassisted corporate umbrella organizations known as chaebol,11 family
businesses have served as the ultimate engines of growth and pushed world
economies to where they have never been before. Family-owned and run
companies constitute “a bedrock of commercial activity and creativity”12 in
every country in the world. Sadly, despite their integral and incomparable
contributions to fueling economies and creating wealth in the world, some
family businesses have earned the negative reputation of being severely
dominated by a family patriarch or matriarch, his or her children or heirs.
These dominating figures are often resistant to change, adamantly refuse to
listen to outside advice, are unfriendly to independent directors, and
establish boards filled with insider and grey directors. Numerous studies
have been conducted on why controlling family members behave this way.
In the last twenty or so years, spurred not only by the need to mimic
the move to independent boards by publicly-held institutions,13 but also
because of the valuable direction and monitoring provided by independent
directors, family-controlled companies have been slowly shifting strategies
by adding more independent members to their boards. The globalized
business environment has also encouraged family firms to explore this
option. Some companies have maintained an almost equal number of
insiders and independents on the board. Others have gone to the extent of
placing a clear supermajority of independent directors on the board. It is
becoming the prevalent view that independent directors and independent
boards help ease and minimize the problems normally associated with
family-run businesses.
agents, pottery makers, spinners, bankers, military uniform suppliers, and the like).
9. During the May 2008 Berkshire Hathaway annual shareholders’ meeting, Warren
Buffet announced that his company is interested in acquiring German family-run and owned
businesses to establish its presence in Europe. Alistair Barr, Berkshire Eyes German
May
3,
2008,
Family-owned
Businesses,
MARKETWATCH,
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/berkshire-eyes-german-family-owned-businesses.
10. See Haruhito Takeda, Corporate Governance in the Inter-War Zaibatsu, in THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN AND BRITAIN 59, 62-63 (Robert
Fitzgerald & Etsuo Abe eds., 2004) (“The principle of ownership was based on investment
exclusivity, the limiting of investors to the same family, and the tendency to exclude
potential sources of capital from outside the family.”). Zaibatsu conglomerates were carteldriven, tightly held companies that were structured as large holding companies. They
typically supplied government requirements. Id.
11. Thayer
Watkins,
Chaebol
of
South
Korea,
http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/chaebol.htm (last visited April 30, 2008).
12. Richard M. Clarke, Family Dynamics and Board Duties: A Delicate Balance, FAM.
BUS. MAG., Winter 2007, at 1.
13. Guido Corbetta & Carlo A. Salvato, The Board of Directors in Family Firms: One
Size Fits All?, 17 FAM. BUS. REV. 119, 119-20 (June 2004).
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This paper seeks to provide an analysis and synthesis of the issues,
challenges, and resolutions facing family companies with regard to
independent boards. It cites the strong advantages of purposefully placing
highly competent independent directors as overseers, guides, analysts,
monitoring agents, change catalysts, mentors, stewards, and sounding
boards to and of the CEO, the successor, and other family members
actively participating in running the business. The time has arrived when
the patriarch or matriarch no longer holds the business together all by
himself or herself,14 or even with the aid of a responsible son or a daughter.
Individual or sole leadership has had its day and its time has passed.
Independent directors, as the new stewards, help steer the hands of these
once ultra powerful individuals and families towards a better, more
defined, socially responsible, genuinely empowered, and ethically
governed stewardship of the family business in the hopes that it shall
survive and thrive beyond a hundred or more years of creditable
existence.15
II.

THE FAMILY BUSINESS CONTEXT

There are plenty of reasons why families go into business. For some,
entrepreneurship is something coincidental, accidental, and unintended,
leading to financial success and consistent business growth years later.
Others have started a business to create a challenge after retirement, to
augment a meager family income, to avoid starvation and poverty,16 to
support siblings, or for “meeting the needs.”17 Some continue on the
legacies of past generations by growing existing businesses. There are also
individuals who craved for financial stability as a result of immigration and
turned to business as their way to achieve this goal.18 It has likewise served
as an avenue of self-expression and self-enterprise. Donald Trump
jumpstarted his career in his family’s real estate business in New York after
studying at the Wharton Business School. Charles Henry Dow, Edward
Davis Jones, and Charles Milford Bergstresser started Dow Jones & Co. in

14. See ELFREN SICANGCO CRUZ, SETTING FRAMEWORKS: FAMILY BUSINESS AND
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 75 (2005) (noting the need for family businesses to institute a
board of directors in order to become globally competitive).
15. This is in contrast to the short life span which characterizes many family-run
businesses. See generally JOHN L. WARD, KEEPING THE FAMILY BUSINESS HEALTHY (1987)
(analyzing the challenges of maintaining the long-term health of a family-run business).
16. Gordon Brannan, Bhiwar Enterprises, Richard Ivey School of Business, The
University of Western Ontario 9A86C051, Feb. 2007, at 1.
17. Michael J. Roberts, Sam Steinberg (A) and (B) (Condensed), HARV. BUS. SCH.
Note. 9-392-044, Mar. 1993, at 3-4.
18. Alexis Gendron, Iggy’s Bread of the World, HARV. BUS. SCH. Note 9-801-282, Mar.
2001, at 2-8.
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a small basement office in New York in 1882 to help Wall Street analyze
the rise and fall of securities, setting the stage for Hugh Bancroft to become
Dow Jones president in 1928 (and creating a family empire in the
process).19 Warren Buffet started off by working at the investment
company Graham-Newman, and after gaining some experience, he went
back to Omaha and began a limited investing fund partnership with a group
of friends, family, and associates called the Buffett Partnerships Ltd.--the
staging ground for his highly successful Berkshire Hathaway.20 These are
immensely entrepreneurial people who started small with self-run family
businesses that later graduated into large conglomerates. The short end of
it is that there are a variety of reasons why people start family businesses.
In fact, some first generation entrepreneurs may totally be unaware that
they are building the foundations of multinational business organizations.
There are two theories commonly applied to corporate entities in
general. The Agency theory espouses the view that, in the context of a
board, directors are seen as agents and managers of the institution whose
vital task is to protect the interests of only the shareholders as residual
owners of the company.21 They monitor the CEO and the implementation
of corporate strategies, determine the level of CEO pay, plan for company
succession,22 and provide overarching supervision. These activities and
functions allow the directors to ensure that officers are performing their
roles in alignment with the interests of the shareholders.
In contrast to the Agency theory, the Stewardship theory is keenly
interested in ascertaining that the directors’ interests and motivations are
aligned with the goals and objectives of the organization as a whole. This
means that the steward’s interest is aligned with the stakeholders’. Under
this theory, the “board’s primary role is to service and advise, rather than to

19. Dow Jones and the Wall Street Journal are now securely owned by Rupert Murdoch
after an emotional tug of war between Murdoch and the Bancroft family. See Joe Nocera, A
Family’s Benign Neglect at Dow Jones, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2007,
http://select.nytimes.com/2007/08/04/business/
04nocera.html?scp=1&sq=how+the+bancrofts+blew+it&st=nyt
(reporting
Murdoch’s
takeover of the Wall Street Journal from the Bancroft family).
20. See Wall Street Week with Fortune, ‘The Best Advice I Ever Got’: Warren Buffett,
Mar. 7, 2005, http://www.pbs.org/wsw/news/fortunearticle_20050307_01.html (last visited
on April 23, 2008) (chronicling Buffett’s rise to prominence). See also Woopidoo!
Biographies,
Warren
Edward
Buffett Biography,
http://www.woopidoo.com/
biography/warren_buffett.htm (last visited on April 23, 2008) (providing a concise
biography of Warren Buffett).
21. See generally Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301 (1983) (analyzing the results of the separation of decisionmaking and risk-bearing functions within business structures).
22. See Barbara Spector, Mike Henningsen’s Bright Idea, FAM. BUS. MAG., Winter
2003, at 1177-80 (noting that non-family boards of directors ensure objectivity in succession
planning).
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discipline and monitor, as agency theory prescribes.”23 Stewardship as a
model emphasizes:
(a) values of service over self-interest; (b)
responsibility by prioritizing long-term gains and values over short-term,
myopic greed; (c) and develops good governance, clear working processes,
open communications, and encompassing empowerment.24 Collectivist and
stakeholder-oriented, stewardship fittingly applies to the family business
model setting.
Some scholars25 suggest that a board dominated by insiders or
company-affiliated directors (also known as “grey directors”) is a correct
match for a company practicing stewardship. This is not always the case,
however, and this view may be losing its advocates. More and more,
family-run businesses, big and small, are revamping their board of directors
by putting more independents than insiders or grey directors on their
boards. A majority of family businesses should in fact welcome
independent directors into the boardroom. This is part of the service and
advisory functions of stewardship.
Transparent processes, good
governance, and an empowering atmosphere are the general results of
placing independents in a board.
A.

Pros and Cons of a Family-run Business

A family business is a natural subset of a close corporation, which is
typified by a small number of stockholders, no ready market for the shares,
owner-management, and substantial participation by the majority
stockholder in the management and operations of the corporation.26 It is
similar to a partnership since “stockholders of a close corporation occupy a
position similar to that of joint adventurers and partners . . . . [T]he
practical realities of the organization and functioning of a small ‘two-man’
corporation . . . [is] to carry on a small business enterprise in which the
stockholders, directors, and managers are the same persons.”27
Family-controlled corporations provide an innate synergy between
parents, siblings, and intergenerational kin in helping and assisting each
other run the affairs of the business. Since they are husbands and wives,
brothers and sisters, uncles and nieces, grandparents and kin, there is an
23. Corbetta & Salvato, supra note 13, at 123.
24. William Alexander, Presentation on Stewardship at Wharton School’s Course on
Strategies and Practices of Family-Controlled Companies (Jan. 22, 2008) (on file with
author).
25. See C. Sundaramurthy & M. Lewis, Control and Collaboration: Paradoxes of
Governance, 28 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 397, 409 (2003) (”[I]nsiders . . . provide a rich
knowledge of and strong commitment to the firm.”).
26. See Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583-85 (Ill. 1964) (listing the attributes of a
closed corporation).
27. Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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expected familial bond that potentially lays the foundation of good business
governance and smooth interpersonal communication. Family businesses
are good for openly communicating and mutually coordinating families.28
If contrasted to a publicly-held corporation, family-run businesses or close
corporations provide distinct advantages to shareholders, such as familiness
and an easier vehicle for stewardship. Other advantages include trust29 and
mutuality of interests.
However, as stated earlier, there are also several disadvantages to
family-run businesses. First, due to the closed and insular nature of the
business, there is great opportunity for the majority shareholder to oppress
minority shareholders, such as an older brother lording over a company to
the detriment of a younger brother and his family who own fewer shares.30
Similarly, rightful dividends may be withheld (refusal to declare), corporate
earnings may be siphoned off, exorbitant salaries may be paid to the
majority shareholder or his favored kin, or employment to a competent son
or daughter of a minority shareholder may be unjustifiably refused.31
Second, these entities create opportunities for “freeze-outs”32 and squeezeouts, two “draconian”33 terms that imply oppressive, coercive, and
preclusive tactics and devices used by the majority owners to force the
minority owners out of the business.34 Third, as a result of major
disagreements, ego, pride, jealousy,35 or simple lack of trust,36 problems at
home are brought into the workplace, resulting, for example, in a minority
owner sibling being arbitrarily terminated (dismissed without cause) by a
28. See generally Johanna M. Hurstak & Jennifer Raiser, Salvatore Ferragamo, SpA,
11 FAM. BUS. REV. 145, 145-63 (June 1998) (illustrating the benefits of family business).
29. See generally Robert Galford & Anne Seibold Drapeau, The Enemies of Trust,
HARV. BUS. REV., Feb. 2003, at 88-95 (arguing that the productivity of a business
organization is directly correlated to the level of trust within that organization).
30. John S. Powell, Your Risks as a Board Member, FAM. BUS. MAG., Autumn 1993, at
1-2.
31. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 329 (9th ed. 2005). See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New
England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 517-19 (Mass. 1975) (holding for an increased duty of
loyalty in the close corporation context due to the asymmetric distribution of power among
majority and minority stockholders).
32. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass. 1976)
(explaining that one feature of close corporations is the ability of majority stockholders to
oppress, disadvantage or “freeze out” minority stockholders).
33. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388 (Del. 1995) (declaring
supermajority voting provisions, shareholder rights plans and the ilk “draconian” because of
their use in protecting the corporation from perceived threats).
34. See id. (citing advance notice by-laws, supermajority voting provisions, shareholder
rights plans and repurchase programs as examples of “draconian” tactics).
35. See WARD, supra note 15, at 3 (stating that many family businesses find family
relations and infighting to be a stumbling block).
36. John L. Davis & Kacie LaChapelle, J. Perez Foods (A), HARV. BUS. SCH. Note 9801-147, Mar. 2001, at 1-12.

OSIFINAL_SIX

188

1/22/2010 5:14:57 PM

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 12:1

dominant, older sibling.37 Fourth, old wounds related to past family
bickering tend to surface and take precedence when running family-based
organizations.38 Fifth, and more importantly, business patriarchs or
founders, overwhelmed by egotism and fueled by their need to stay in
power for fear of reaching the point of needlessness,39 may unwittingly or
intentionally restrain the growth of the next-in-line by failing to listen to
advice, dismissing the next generation’s suggestions, failing to collaborate,
and disregarding their own weaknesses.40 Sixth, family members, as
jugglers of various corporate hats (owner, shareholder, manager, director,
family office holders, and others), have immense conflicts of interest and a
lack of transparency that may indirectly subject the business to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.41 Other negatives are the often emotional bases of
leadership and work ethos,42 the prevalence of informality, incessant
feelings of undervaluation by the family as sources of conflict,43 the
always-in-the-shadow-of-dad sentiment,44 centralized decision-making
processes, and the occasional lack of correlation between business skills

37. See Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351, 355 (Mass. 1996) (noting that
despite the possible specter of illegally discharging minority owner-managers, “[n]ot every
discharge of an at-will employee of a close corporation who happens to own stock in the
corporation gives rise to a successful breach of fiduciary duty claim. The plaintiff was
terminated in accordance with his employment contract and fairly compensated for his
stock. He failed to establish a sufficient basis for a breach of fiduciary duty claim . . . .”).
38. When running a family business, it is often very difficult to separate family affairs
and pure business activities. Normally, family biases, prejudices, infighting, and past
conflicts tend to consistently surface, typically overshadowing business-only matters.
39. William Alexander, Lecturer, Presentation on The Outgoing Generation at Wharton
School’s Course on Strategies and Practices of Family-Controlled Companies (Apr. 22,
2008) (on file with author).
40. See DYER, supra note 4, at 59-61 (analyzing the importance and possible
shortcomings of the founder in developing firm culture).
41. See François de Visscher, Board Members Beware: Ethics Issues Abound, FAM.
BUS. MAG., Winter 2005, at 2-3 (explaining the need for family companies to
professionalize in the face of sweeping reforms instituted under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
See also Matthew K. Donovan, Are You Ready for Corporate Reform?, FAM. BUS. MAG.,
Spring 2003, at 1-3 (arguing that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has serious implications for
private family-owned businesses).
42. There are family businesses where the founder or founding owner believes that he
alone can lead the company, and if reforms are necessary, only he can conceptualize and
implement them. Emotionally, this bullheaded founder/leader seldom has trust in other
people, whether they are non-family managers or his own kin. In some cases, a son or the
eldest child of the founder is appointed as successor not because of abilities, education or
experience, but purely because of blood ties.
43. See DENNIS T. JAFFE, WORKING WITH THE ONES YOU LOVE 88-91, (Conari Press
1990) (analyzing common sources of interpersonal conflict within a family business).
44. See Peter Grant, Family Divide: At Cablevision, Father-Son Split Looms Over
Future, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2005, at A1 (discussing the difficulties faced by Cablevision
CEO James Dolan in escaping the shadow of his father, the company’s founder).
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and power conferment (nepotism).45
B.

Contrast to Publicly-Held Corporations: Market Model vs. Control
Model

Family businesses differ from publicly-held corporations in their chain
of command.46 The latter are typically composed of thousands of
diversified shareholders who do not know each other, have no participation
in the business except owning the shares and reaping dividends, and have
no familial ties to each other or to the leaders of the business.47 Publiclyheld companies also have corporate officers appointed by the board of
directors, who themselves are selected by the shareholders during annual
shareholders’ meetings.48 Currently, a typical public company’s board is
composed of approximately ten members, 90% of whom are often
independent directors, while the remaining insider is the CEO.49
Conversely, family businesses generally are controlled primarily by family
members, their boards of directors are often composed of blood kin with a
sprinkling of independents, and their shareholders are often underdiversified, consisting mostly of relatives.50 There are exceptions to this
rule, as there are very large family corporations in the United States that
would rival any publicly-held company.51 Family firms are business
groups that have three levels of command—the owners, the board of
directors, and the firm’s top management—often consisting of the same
45. See Craig E. Aronoff & John L. Ward, Rules for Nepotism, NATION’S BUSINESS,
Jan. 1993, at 64 (arguing that family members should be required to meet certain objective
qualifications before being invited to join the family firm).
46. See Corbetta & Salvato, supra note 13, at 123 (discussing the distinct theoretical
perspectives to understand the characteristics of boards of directors).
47. ROBERT D. MCCRIE, SECURITY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT 18 (2nd ed., Butterworth
Heinemann, 2006).
48. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141-142 (2004).
49. See Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal For Improved Corporate
Governance, 48 BUS. LAW. 59, 67 (1992) (arguing that corporate boards should be limited to
ten members). See also Roger Raber, National Association of Corporate Directors’
President and CEO, Corporate Governance in the Global Economy: Roles and
Responsibilities of Corporate Directors, Address before the Research Institute of Economy,
Trade
&
Industry,
IAA
(July
26,
2006),
available
at
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/bbl/06072601.html (stating that the National Association of
Corporate Directors’ optimum board size is eight to eleven members).
50. See Peter Davis, Make-or-Break Criteria for Outside Directors, FAM. BUS. MAG.,
Spring 1993, at 1-2 (noting that boards of family-owned corporations often serve an
advisory function with little actual authority).
51. Examples are brewers Anheuser-Busch, Molson Coors Brewing and snackfoods
company Mars. See Eleanor Wason & Jessica Hall, Vanishing Independence for Large
Family Companies, THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, July 14, 2008,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/07/14/business/deal15.php (discussing difficulties faced
by family-run companies such as Anheuser-Busch in the modern business environment).
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individuals, mostly from the same family.52
The Control Model is the ideal representation of family business
organizations in Asia, Europe, and Latin America.53 It features a
concentrated shareholder base, illiquid shares, a tendency to be secretive,
an intense focus on long-term strategy, a majority of insiders on the board,
and a significant overlap between management and ownership.54 In
particular, the Japanese Company Community corporate system reflects
this model.55 Close corporations have these characteristics as well.56
On the other hand, the Market Model is applicable to publicly-held
organizations generally found in the United States and United Kingdom.57
These businesses have dispersed shareholders, such as institutional
investors and individual stockholders.58 Although there are controlling
shareholders in certain companies, there is generally a “fluid aggregation of
unaffiliated stockholders.”59 Share ownership is very liquid as owners can
easily sell them to the public.60 These businesses are governed by strict
corporate governance duties and have high levels of periodic or annual
disclosure.61 There may be cases of short-term performance bias rather
than long-term growth focus.62 The board is populated by outside
52. L. T. Larsson & L. Melin, The 2nd International Conference on Corporate
Governance and Direction at the Henley Management College: The Board of Directors
Driving Swedish SMEs Forward: Some Observations from a Non-executive Director
Perspective (1999).
53. See Suzanne Lane et al., Guidelines for Family Business Boards of Directors, 19
FAM. BUS. REV. 147 (June 2006) (noting that the Control Model is prevalent in geographical
areas where ownership and control rights are concentrated).
54. Joseph H. Astrachan et al., Generic Models for Family Business Boards of
Directors, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON FAMILY BUSINESS 320 (Panikkos Poutziouris, et
al., eds., 2006).
55. Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of
Corporate Law and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 213-14 (2000) (noting that the
Company Community system grants employees a level of informal control which serves to
decrease “the diversity of the interests among those controlling the firm”).
56. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-356 (2008).
57. Astrachan et al., supra note 54, at 319.
58. Id.
59. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994)
(“Control of the corporation is not vested in a single person, entity, or group, but vested in
the fluid aggregation of unaffiliated shareholders.”).
60. Laura Nyantung Beny, Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the World:
An Empirical Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate, 32 IOWA J. CORP.
L. 237, 249-52 (2007).
61. Id. at 269-70. See also Gary K. Meek, Clare B. Roberts & Sidney J. Gray, Factors
Influencing Voluntary Annual Disclosures by U.S., U.K. and Continental European
Multinational Corporations, 26 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 555 (1995) (studying the factors
influencing voluntary disclosure of strategic, nonfinancial and financial information).
62. See generally Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187 (1991)
(examining multiple models of corporate governance and their influence on, inter alia,
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independent board members and ownership of the shares is separated from
the company’s management.63 Many family corporations in North America
tend to reflect the Control Model, but large family corporations may
already be mirroring the Market Model.64
For family-run enterprises, there must be a constant balance of the
culture, personalities, and self-interests as “board-management relations in
family firms are often described as requiring simultaneous independence
and interdependence, distance and closeness.”65 This balance is not always
seen in publicly-held corporations,66 since shareholders do not know each
other, shares are held in street name by the securities firm, and these
residual owners are usually rationally apathetic to the day-to-day activities
in the business.67
C.

The Role of the Board of Directors

The role of the board of directors in a family-run company has certain
similarities to boards of publicly-owned corporations. The board’s roles in
publicly held companies are the selection, evaluation, and rewarding of
CEOs; monitoring of the officers’ compliance with national and state laws,
IRS policies, and SEC rulings; and other supervisory functions.68 Boards
of public companies likewise approve corporate strategies, assess these
strategies periodically, and undertake CEO evaluation and board
performance self-evaluation on a regular basis.69 “A good board will
regularly question its own work; this self-examination enables the board to

profit horizons).
63. Id.
64. Stephen J. Simurda, Going Public in a Rollup, FAM. BUS. MAG., Summer 1997, at
1. See Wayne Messick, Family Business as Big Business: It's Not Just Mom & Pop
IBIZRESOURCES,
Anymore,
http://www.familybusinessstrategies.com/articles03/3263wdm.html (last visited Sept. 19,
2009) (profiling several large, publicly traded family-owned corporations); Pete Engardio,
Mom-and-Pop Multinationals, BUSINESSWEEK, July 14 & 21, 2008, at 77-78 (noting that
small family businesses are increasingly sourcing services from across the globe).
65. Corbetta & Salvato, supra note 13, at 122.
66. See Samuel C. Johnson, WHY WE’LL NEVER GO PUBLIC, FAM. BUS. MAG., May
1990, at 1 (stating that dealing with diverse shareholder expectations and potential takeovers
encumbers most public corporation CEOs).
67. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 202-03 (Oxford University Press 2008) (arguing that shareholders are rationally
apathetic because the costs of expending time and energy to make an informed decision
outweigh the possible benefits).
68. Id. at 157-62.
69. See Daniele Marchesani, The Concept of Autonomy and the Independent Director of
Public Corporations, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 315, 319-21 (2005) (discussing the different
roles of boards of directors in the operation of large companies).
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become a ‘learning organization.’”70 Board members do not perform dayto-day functions, as these are reserved for the corporate officers.71 They
provide advice and counsel to the officers and to the organization at large,
lend their reputation to the firm, and, at times, use their social, professional,
and political networks to further the company’s interests.72 Since these
directors may also be directors in other large firms, they are able to bring
with them vast amounts of corporate wisdom and experience.
Family business boards with independent directors have similar
qualities to independent boards of publicly-held companies. However,
insider boards are a different story because the owners are usually the
managers themselves.73 For very small operations or sole proprietorships,
the husband or the wife is the sole owner and manager, the children
perform some work, and they employ one or two employees.74 They may
not even have a board.75 If they do, it is most likely composed of a brother,
a sister, and everyone else working in the business.76 These boards might
be paper-only boards to satisfy government requirements for
incorporation.77
Larger, more sophisticated, and more evolved family-owned
businesses will have boards with a few outsiders.78 Some will even have a
majority of independent directors.79 These boards perform servicing,

70. F. Friedrich Neubauer, Good Boards Engage in Self-Evaluation, FAM. BUS. MAG.,
Summer 1995, at 1.
71. See Marchesani, supra note 69, at 319-20 (explaining the role of boards of directors
of large companies).
72. See Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards of Directors, 40 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 781, 805-07 (2003) (explaining the relational role of the board).
73. See Peter Davis, The Politics of Family Boards, FAM. BUS. MAG., May 1990, at 1
(stating that most privately held firms’ boards are mere legal fictions, dismissed because
they are seen as obtrusive to the owners’ creativity and entrepreneurial spirit).
74. Brian A. Blum, The Goals and Process of Reorganizing Small Businesses in
Bankruptcy, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 181, 188 (2000) (opining that small businesses
comprise "Mom and Pop running their little store").
75. See Interview by Dr. Nagendra V. Chowdary with John A. Davis, Senior Lecturer
of Business Administration at Harvard Business School (May 2007), available at
http://www.ibscdc.org/executive-interviews/Q&A_with_John_A_Davis_3.htm (discussing
his research on managing family businesses, including the different types of family
businesses and how to manage conflicts within family businesses).
76. See John A. Davis, Governing the Family-Run Business, HAR. BUS. SCH. WORKING
KNOWLEDGE, Sept. 4, 2001, available at http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/2469.html (discussing
the ways to achieve effective governance in a family business).
77. See John A. Davis, Organizing the Family-Run Business, HAR. BUS. SCH. WORKING
KNOWLEDGE, Oct. 1, 2001, available at http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/2536.html (suggesting
recommendations about how to create an effective board of directors).
78. See George G. Raymond Jr., Between Father and Son Stands . . . The Board, FAM.
BUS. MAG., Winter 2002, at 4 (recalling the benefits of outside board members in the
resolution of certain disputes at Lyon-Raymond Corp.).
79. See Comments of Andreas Sohmen-Pao, Managing Director of BW Shipping
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advising, and supervising functions; guide the entity to target goals and the
proper use of assets and resources; hire and fire the CEO; help develop and
finally approve long-term strategies; and periodically assess the
management and the board itself.80 They also protect the interests of the
shareholders, oversee the family’s participation in the business, perform
“diligent oversight,”81 and “help make big-picture business decisions.”82
Boards are critical in succession issues, as they pick who will succeed the
founder or existing CEO.83 Boards should ask challenging questions to
management84 and, likewise, should interface with management on behalf
of the shareholders.85 For Alexander, family boards are preeminently
constituted to “maximize shareholder value under the guidelines and
constraints given to it by the shareholders.”86
Directors must be able to coordinate with the CEO (through the
human resources department) on the list of potential successors, to guide
and coach the successor-in-waiting or heir apparent (if an insider), to
wisely intervene (if needed) in emotional outbursts due to succession
crises, and to conduct a fair and reasonable selection process.87 They must
also keep the company on track with any succession plan it has developed,
and prevent the founder-CEO from unduly extending his or her term of
office or delaying his or her predetermined retirement.88 A two-to-threeyear window for transition cannot unilaterally be extended to a five-to-

Managers, in Knowledge@SMU, The Source of Competitive Advantage in a Family
Business
is
the
Family,
Mar.
3,
2008,
available
at
http://knowledge.smu.edu.sg/article.cfm?articleid=1123 (stating that his family’s firm is
comprised of a mix of family members and independent directors).
80. See Nancy Langton, The Role of Boards of Directors in a Family Business: ThreeCircle Model Helps Define Role, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, September 26, 2005, at P1, P3
(discussing how directors of a family business help manage the financial health of the
business).
81. See MILLER & BRETON-MILLER, supra note 3, at 211-213 (“[D]irectors are the
critical nexus between shareholders and top managers. It is they who must establish and
oversee the executive incentives and monitoring mechanisms.”).
82. John A. Davis & Keely Cormier, Board Directors of the Family Firm, HARV. BUS.
SCH. Note 9-800-025, Mar. 2001, at 3-5.
83. A CEO who handpicks his successor, without guidance and in absolute mockery of
his board of directors, is a corporate tyrant who fails to serve the interests of the
shareholders. Concomitantly, this elucidates an example of a disempowered, failing board.
84. See Marc A. Schwartz & Louis B. Barnes, Outside Boards and Family Businesses:
Another Look, 4 FAM. BUS. REV. 269, 279-80 (Fall 1991) (assessing survey results from
interviews with CEOs about the areas that outside directors are the most and least helpful).
85. Alexander, supra note 39.
86. Id.
87. See Ivan Lansberg, Independent Directors in the Middle, FAM. BUS. MAG., Summer
1999, at 4 (declaring that boards of directors should help owners assess the feasibility of and
assumptions underlying their vision for the future).
88. Id. at 7.
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seven-year window.89 If provided with unfettered discretion, founders tend
to keep themselves at the helm until the day they die.90 The board must be
strict in this regard, yet they should also be the sounding board of the
departing executive.91 It may be good that at least one of the independent
directors is of the same age and stature as the departing founder-CEO so
that the former can explain his or her own transition process and how he or
she was able to successfully cope with life after twenty or thirty years in
power.92 While all of these are the ideal functions of the board, the reality
is different. In the 2002 American Family Business Survey, approximately
half of the respondents’ boards were found to have met only once or twice
per year, while 13% of those who responded never met at all. Seventy
percent (70%) of the respondents said they have no board subcommittees,
while a substantial number reported weak board performance.93 Worse, the
survey revealed that most family businesses do not even use their directors
in the CEO succession process.94
As in the case of publicly-held companies, directors in family
businesses have certain fiduciary duties to the shareholders and the
corporation.95 They must exercise their duties in good faith, with the care
that a typically prudent and responsible person in a similar position would
do under similar circumstances, and in a manner that the directors (even
non-family, minority directors) believe is in the best interests of the
corporation.96 Boards make sure that managers manage the company
optimally.97 Boards that fail to perform their specific functions include
paper boards, management committee impersonators, shareholder group
impersonators, and mere crony groupings.98
In both family businesses and publicly-owned corporations, directors
may be classified as insiders, grey, or independent. For family businesses,
insider directors are family members who run the businesses, such as the
CEO or a kin who is the Vice-President. Grey directors are not fully
independent directors as they have significant business or relational ties
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 7-8.
93. Mike Cohn, Why Some Boards Work Better Than Others, FAM. BUS. MAG., Winter
2004, at 1.
94. Id.
95. See JAMES J. JURINSKI & GARY A. ZWICK, TRANSFERRING INTERESTS IN THE
CLOSELY HELD FAMILY BUSINESS 27 (2002) (discussing tax and business issues that affect
family firms).
96. Id.
97. See generally Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors
and Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1318
(1998) (observing the link between active board monitoring and corporate performance).
98. Alexander, supra note 39.
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with the company, yet were still considered as “outside” directors in the
past. Grey directors may be customers, suppliers, bank officers, or other
industry members. They may also be outside advisers who have existing or
previous contracts with management. Independent directors, on the other
hand, are non-aligned, neutral directors who have absolutely no ties with
the business by themselves or through their next of kin, do not have
existing or previous contractual arrangements with the corporation, and
have never been an employee or officer. Some of these independent
directors are CEOs or presidents of other large boards or institutions, deans
or distinguished professors of business schools, or professionally trained
individuals. An independent board, therefore, would be a company board
whose members are primarily composed of directors who are neither
insiders nor grey directors, nor otherwise affiliated with the company one
way or another.
For Corbetta and Salvato, the critical measure of a board of directors
is board capital, which is comprised of (a) adequate board size, (b)
directors’ personal and occupational background and knowledge, and (c)
board activism that encompassed collective processes and access to
information.99 For them, the ideal governing bodies for successfully-run
family businesses would be “large, active, and external boards, the latter
characteristic usually meaning that nonexecutive directors should not have
personal or professional relationships with the family or the firm.”100
Though assisting in resolving family squabbles and dramas goes with the
territory, independent directors must not be so drawn into battle that they
lose competence and neutrality. Stone has argued that:
Outside directors are not shrinks. They’re businesspeople trained to
focus on business problems . . . [b]ut if they are confronted with a family
situation, say, a rivalry between siblings for leadership, they could help
move things forward by defining the leader’s role and structuring a
communication process that acknowledges that both siblings want to be
leaders.101

99. See Corbetta & Salvato, supra note 13, at 128 (“According to this logic, a large
board entirely composed of insiders (i.e., current and former officers of the firm) will
provide less resources and network links than an equally large board composed of insiders,
business experts (e.g., current and former senior officers and directors of other firms),
support specialists (e.g., lawyers, bankers, insurance company representatives, public
relation experts), and community influentials (e.g., political leaders, university faculty,
leaders of social or community organizations).”).
100. Id. at 121.
101. Deanne Stone, The Outsiders, FAM. BUS. MAG., Winter 2007, at 4.
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Is a Board of Directors Needed and When? The Case of Vietri,
Inc.

It has been argued that not all family business enterprises need
independent directors. Indeed, some family businesses, especially those
that have been recently established, may not need the presence of an
independent board at all, or at least not during the formative years.102 If the
businesses are too small, lacking a professional management team and
effective financial systems, a formal board may be dangerous and a
distraction.103 The reason is that companies in their very early years are, or
should be, more concerned with how to ensure the following week’s
payroll, what products to develop, and how these products should be
marketed and sold. Oftentimes, a board “champion” is needed to change
the status quo of having no board of directors.104 This “champion” may be
the founder himself, a successor, or a long-time manager who can convince
the company leadership that a board of directors will help steer the business
to greater heights. Boards ought to be seen as valuable contributors by
both first generation entrepreneurs and by well-seasoned family business
executives. They bring in not only sound advice and experience from the
outside, but they may also serve to redirect the company to the route it
should have taken in the first place. Family companies derive substantial
benefits from formal boards “of outside directors consisting of a majority
102. Howard Fischer & Jane Stevenson, Building the High-EQ Board, FAM. BUS. MAG.,
Summer 2007, at 2. The Quaker Chemical Corp. is a leading global provider of process
chemicals, chemical specialties, services, and technical expertise. Id. For the first thirty or
so years of its corporate existence, there was a board of directors populated only by insiders.
Id. This was from 1918 to circa the 1950s. Id. When Peter A. Benoliel took over from his
father in 1960s, he recruited two outside directors. Id. By the time the company went
public in 1972, the board had a majority of outside directors. Id. By 1997, it had an elevenperson board, eight of whom were outsiders. Id. It is still a very successful and profitable
company today.). “Sigismundus W. W. Lubsen, a Dutch citizen, succeeded Peter Benoliel
as CEO in May 1993, breaking a decades-long tradition of family leadership. Lubsen
restructured the company, cutting the workforce by 10 percent and earmarking the savings
for the growing Asian and South American markets.” Quaker Chemical Corporation,
ANSWERS.COM, http://www.answers.com/topic/quaker-chemical-corporation (last visited on
Mar. 11, 2009). But Mr. Lubsen’s term as CEO was short-lived as he resigned in mid-1995
to join Netherlands-based Heineken N.V. Id. Then Chairman of the board Peter Benoliel
stepped in as Acting CEO. Id. By 1997, Peter Benoliel vacated the position of Chairman of
the board but remained a board member. Id. He left the board in 2005. Id. He had served
as CEO for a total of 27 years and Chairman for 17 years. See Donald J. Jonovic, What
Most Businesses Need Before an Outside Board, FAM. BUS. MAG., Winter 1993, at 1-2
(suggesting that an independent board may not be effective until the company has made it
past the “transition between entrepreneurial venture and professional management”).
103. See Donald J. Jonovic, Outside Review in a Wider Context: An Alternative to the
Classic Board, 2 FAM. BUS. REV. 125, 126 (Summer 1989) (discussing why an outside board
of directors may be inefficient for family companies).
104. See Davis, supra note 50, at 3.
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of independent, risk-taking peers.”105
In fact, there are some family-controlled businesses which started in
their very first (founding) year with a fully operational, formal board of
directors. In the case of Vietri, Inc. (named after an Italian fishing village)
of Hillsborough, North Carolina, a leading wholesaler of Italian ceramics,
the two founding sisters, in the same year they founded the business,
assembled a board of directors made up of themselves, close friends, and
experts.106
Luckily, the two Gravely sisters, Susan and Frances, who were
traveling in Italy with their mother in 1983, chanced upon very finely
crafted ceramic plates in the Amalfi coast where they were having lunch.107
They immediately located the ceramicist, conducted “due diligence” in the
next three days with the help of an interpreter, and struck a deal with the
ceramicist to be the exclusive distributor of his products in the United
States.108 Success immediately followed. With success, they put in place a
formal board of directors to guide them through growth and the growing
pains of their lucrative dinnerware import business.109 One thing the sisters
did wrong, however, was to appoint themselves as co-presidents of a
thriving company.110 Certainly, tensions erupted between them that
threatened the very fabric of the family, not just the business.111 But since
they had the foresight to create a board at the infancy stage of the business,
it became easier to manage and resolve the crises that came about. The
board they instituted was not an independent board; rather, upon their
father’s counsel, it was a board composed of friends who had experiences
in certain areas of business that the sisters did not.112 Although the board
met only once a year, the sisters communicated with their board members
individually half a dozen times per year, whether to seek business advice or
as a sounding board for ideas.113 Despite being an insider board with one
annual formal meeting, it was still a body that was able to assist, serve, and
advise the founders.
105. See Jonovic, supra note 103, at 129.
106. See Deanne Stone, Making a Sibling Startup Work, FAM. BUS. MAG., Spring 1996,
at 1-2 (discussing the history of Veitri, a family business that sells imported dinnerware and
suggesting that a major reason for the company’s success has been its board of directors,
consisting of the owners’ close friends).
107. Id.; Vietri, About Us, http://www.vietri.com/aboutus/aboutus.cfm (last visited Apr.
30, 2008).
108. Vietri, About Us, http://www.vietri.com/aboutus/aboutus.cfm (last visited Apr. 30,
2008).
109. Stone, supra note 106, at 5-6.
110. Id. at 6.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 4-5. This meant that their board members were all grey directors as they had
familial or relational ties with the owners of the business. Id.
113. Id. at 5.
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At one point, Susan Gravely was approached by a dinnerware
company that wanted to be bought out by Vietri, Inc.114 She was very
interested and excited with the prospect. But after consulting with the
board, it was decided that the businesses were not complementary.115 Had
she not listened to the board’s sound advice, or if Vietri, Inc. had no board
at all, then the sisters could have immediately jumped into a business
venture not knowing the traps and liabilities of that company. In time, the
board proved instrumental in making the sisters-owners more mature and
sensitive in their approach to the business. Susan eventually became the
president and Frances became the vice-president for marketing.116 They
were able to “[carve] out separate domains” for each sibling.117 Many years
later, when the board recommended to Susan Gravely that she needed to
designate a successor just in case something happened to her, she maturely,
yet painfully, anointed Vietri, Inc.’s ten-year accountant instead of her
sister, Frances.118 The latter accepted the decision.119 The board, in
essence, played a key role in ensuring that the sibling rivalry ordinarily
found between sisters did not threaten to consume the enterprise.120 Vietri,
Inc. continues to be a profitable business today.
D.

Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty, Care and Good Faith to Minority
Shareholders

Duties of loyalty, good faith, and care are not exclusive to publiclyheld corporations. In a family business, these duties are owed by majority
shareholders/directors to the minority. A breach of the duty of care may
render a family company director (or officer) liable for negligence, while a
violation of the duty of loyalty may render such director (or officer) liable
for unfair self-interested transactions and other improprieties. The
difficulty with applying these duties to family companies or close
corporations is that minority shareholders are not adequately protected.
Termination of a family member/corporate officer may be justified as fair,
given the circumstances. The decisions of a board will be judged, initially,
in line with the “business judgment rule”—the presumption that the
decisions and actions of a board of directors were based on adequate
information and good faith, reached with the best interests of the company
in mind, and that good business practices and reliable processes marked

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
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these decisions as used by courts of equity. Some of the critical
determinants would be if the shareholder/family member was treated
unequally, and in the process his legitimate or reasonable expectations were
defeated (what other similarly situated shareholders would have expected
and believed as fair). The extent of the lack of disinterestedness (a
component of independence) and absence of abuse of discretion will also
be tested. Grossly negligent or uninformed boards will most often be held
accountable and liable by courts of equity.121
In a 1988 case, the trial court judge ruled that there are four specific
fiduciary duties that shareholder-managers in a close corporation (such as a
family business) owe each other: (1) to act with that degree of diligence,
care, and skill which ordinarily prudent persons would exercise under
similar circumstances in like positions; (2) to discharge the duties affecting
their relationship in good faith with a view to furthering the interests of one
another as to matters within the scope of the relationship; (3) to disclose
and not withhold from one another relevant information affecting the status
and affairs of the relationship; and (4) to not use their position, influence,
or knowledge respecting the affairs of the organization that are subject to
the relationship to gain any special privilege or advantage over the other
person or persons involved in the relationship.122
More recently, board directorship has become riskier. The onslaught,
in 2000-2001, of scandals such as Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, and Adelphia
has made life more difficult for CEOs, CFOs, and directors of public and
privately-held companies. One problem with serving as a director (whether
as an insider or an independent) in a family-controlled business is that the
candidate is not usually informed of, or educated about, the potential
liabilities facing board members. Directors in family businesses must bear
in mind that they are not immune from shareholder lawsuits123 that center
on self-dealing transactions or unethical behavior. They can instantly get
caught up as blameless participants in a family feud that they have nothing
to do with, except being a director in the family company.124 In fact, they
may even be closer to the line of fire because of the closed nature of the
business.125 Directors may be sued “by shareholders, competitors,
121. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (holding that a standard
of gross negligence is applied in business judgment director liability).
122. See Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 352 (Me. 1988) (detailing the four
fiduciary duties owed by business associates to each other).
123. See Powell, supra note 30, at 1-2 (noting that family directors may be subject to
shareholder lawsuits).
124. Id.
125. See Visscher, supra note 41, at 2 (“[A]ccording to a Wall Street Journal report, a
study of more than 200 corporate fraud cases brought before the Securities and Exchange
Commission between 1987 and 1997 revealed that most financial-statement fraud is
committed by companies with tiny market capitalizations.”).
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suppliers, unions, customers and other private citizens, and even by . . .
fellow directors,”126 as well as by employees and the government.
Although this may spook putative independent directors or make it harder
for family businesses to retain them, adequate director and officer (D&O)
insurance may assuage possible restlessness and fear of liability. 127 There
are specific insurance products for independent directors in familycontrolled entities.
III. POWERFUL OR POWERLESS? THE CHALLENGES OF INDEPENDENT
DIRECTORS
One important quality that a very successful family business founderCEO often lacks is objectivity. The CEO may be the best in the industry
and control the organization in an optimal and ethical manner, but still lack
the necessary impartiality and emotional detachment that generally
characterize present-day CEOs of publicly-traded companies. FounderCEOs may be too attached or too close to the enterprise,128 feeling that it is
a legacy handed down by esteemed forefathers or a legacy they are handing
down. They may be too sympathetic with workers’ plight, or too caught up
with the notion of family and close family ties.
A CEO may also overreach129 and be too self-absorbed or may not
want to relinquish the power and authority he earned throughout the years.
Instead of identifying redundancies that may impede efficiency, he may
retain employees who serve the same function out of loyalty. This may be
to the company’s detriment in the long-run. As Dyer put it:
[B]ecause founders are often reluctant to have a governing board
review their decisions, there are no checks and balances.
Without an outside perspective to give the decisions a “reality
check” . . . there is a strong possibility that the business will join
70 percent of those that fail in the first generation. In a number
of cases, we have seen founders who, because of poor
information or because of age and senility, make decisions that

126. See Powell, supra note 30, at 2 (noting the various groups able to sue directors).
127. See Visscher, supra note 41, at 3 (finding that retaining and attracting directors
requires remedying the fear of liability).
128. Robert K. Mueller, Differential Directorship: Special Sensitivities and Roles for
Serving the Family Business Board, 1 FAM. BUS. REV. 239 (1988) (describing the likelihood
of the family executive to be too close to the business to have a correct perspective on issues
facing the company).
129. See, e.g., Shel Horowitz, Sam Steinberg's Non-Lasting Legacy, U. MASS. AMHERST
FAM. BUS. CTR., 2008, http://www.umass.edu/fambiz/articles/business_tales/steinberg.html
(last visited Jan. 29, 2009) (describing how a founder’s refusal to trust control of his
business to anyone outside his family damaged it and forced its sale).
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destroy the business.130
Independent directors, due to their detached relationships with the
company and lack of any special or financial relationship with its members,
fill in the gap as objective and emotionally-detached arbiters. They help
keep the balance of the ship and provide the captain with relevant
information and corporate wisdom that will steer the firm away from
disaster. Playing both the hull and the keel, they are able to perform an
effective role as to where the company is sailing. Dubbed as strangers and
outsiders, independent directors possess the qualities that a successful
family CEO or entrepreneur may lack. They similarly have the prerogative
to recommend an alternative course of action, redirect business goals,
constructively criticize management programs, and advise on matters
pertinent to corporate growth. They may also fill in any skills or
networking gaps that hound the owners. Similarly, independent directors
“deal with the pragmatic realities and idiosyncrasies of the family
owners.”131 At bottom, independent directors are not powerless or impotent
in any way. In fact, they may sometimes be viewed with a suspicious and
envious eye by family members, both within and outside of the board, as
they may be a repository of authority.
The presence of independent directors may galvanize the family board
members to spring into action relative to succession issues, business
projections and plans, hiring and firing policies, competence of the
management team, and the retention of professional consultants. These
things may have been neglected by family boards since they are
accustomed to trusting an older sibling to do everything and, thus, have
waived accountability and transparency. According to Howard Fischer and
Jane Stevenson, “To create the ideal board for your company, you need
outside directors who will hold you accountable. You should have the right
mix of talents, personalities, and experience. Above all in a family
company, you need people with high emotional intelligence.”132
A.

Concrete Understanding of the Family Culture133

Despite wielding tremendous authority or the potential to be very
influential, independent directors often face opposition from within the
board and beyond it. Instead of being supported as steward-arbiters, they
may be showered with skepticism and distrust, if not malice. The familial
130. DYER, supra note 4, at 71.
131. Davis, supra note 50, at 1.
132. Fischer & Stevenson, supra note 102, at 1.
133. See WARD, supra note 15, at 18 (“The culture of the family business-–its leadership
and its organization-–influences the achievements of the business far more than any other
factor.”).
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and relational setting of a family business is not traditionally open or
receptive to strangers. According to Cleveland family business consultant
Donald Jonovic, “‘They’re used to playing close to the chest, so bringing in
an outsider is like disrobing in front of a stranger for the first time. Taking
that initial step is hard to do.’”134 The reason for this is simple: as a close
corporation, they are accustomed to working with dad or mom, with an
uncle or an older sibling. In-house supervision and advising is enough;
bringing in a boardroom “policeman” from the outside is suspicious. The
introduction of an independent director to the board—which could be
interpreted as the arrival of a professional critic with policing functions but
who has contributed nothing to the corporation’s working—may be the
sign of a shake-up that some family members, including the company
president and chairman, fear.135 As a corollary, independent directors are
accused of not knowing the business and/or the industry to be worthy of
any policing functions.
As a natural reaction to the entry of someone new into a pre-existing
family business culture, the independent director must not expect a red
carpet upon his arrival. The independent director must, on the contrary, be
on guard as to the sensitivities of the directors he will be working with and
those in the management. It will take time and effort to be completely
absorbed and accepted by a family business board and its management.
The initial blemish of distrust and lack of knowledge of the inner workings
of the company can gradually be swept away if the independent director
behaves professionally, and takes the time to understand the culture and
business dynamics, comprehend corporate finances, and internalize office
or board politics. Friendliness, approachability, prompt attendance, active
and educated participation in board meetings, and working with a positive
aura will work wonders. Once successfully integrated, the independent
director is set to do wonders for the family-controlled company. As
dispassionate and open communicators, they can mediate between family
members.136 They can also contribute to succession programs, transition
periods, selection of key officers, and other important business decisions.
Absent a complete understanding of the family culture, the
independent director may never get beyond the initial impression he makes
as a stranger lacking in specific business or industry knowledge. If
approached poorly, the independent director can forever remain the
suspicious outsider that he initially is. A good example of a family culture
where this idea can be applied is the Wolf Organization. A national
134. Stone, supra note 101, at 2 (quoting Donald Jonovic).
135. See Mike Cohn, Are You Ready for ‘Outsiders’?, FAM. BUS. MAG., Spring 2003, at
2 (describing the difficulties inherent to choosing directors in a family business setting).
136. See Raymond, supra note 79 (noting the calming influence of dispassionate outside
directors on familial relationships).
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provider of construction materials through its lumber yard, with a wellknown advertising and marketing agency, the Wolf Organization is hard to
miss in the materials industry.137 Founded in 1843 by Adam Wolf, the
business has grown from a very modest dry goods and lumber store in rural
Pennsylvania into a more than $250 million enterprise.138 The Wolf
Organization’s website touts that, “Wolf and his descendants developed the
business into a family heirloom, strengthening it from generation to
generation.”139 The business has a unique transition structure which forms
a crucial part of their family culture. The business is typically bought out
by one or two sons from the father at market value, implying the certainty
that siblings who refuse to buy-in to the business or who do not have the
means to purchase the business will be deprived of both ownership and
participation.140 Though this seems common or expected in the larger
business world, it is not so common in the family business setting. The
result, again caused by the family culture, is that sons, who buy the
business from their parents, do not treat the entity as a family legacy.
Rather, they treat it as a mere business venture that they are not required to
perpetuate.141 The family buyers are trained since childhood to see the
business as an investment opportunity. Therefore, when it is the sons’ time
to purchase the business they simply act as interested investors and
financial buyers—assessing the company in terms of potential return on
investments, capitalization structure, liquidity, sufficiency of assets and
other criteria normally used by an outsider buying a company.142 This
extreme view of perceiving the family business merely as a business, plus
the market value or cost associated with acquiring it, may have caused the
substantial divestiture of the sixth generation.143 Since the family business
was seen simply as an investment, when there is a good deal to sell it, the
best option is to take the opportunity to liquidate.144 As of now, only 30%
of ownership in the family business remains in family hands.145 The other
70% of the shares has been acquired by a private equity firm.146 And of the
137. See
Operating
Divisions:
The
Wolf
Organization,
http://www.wolforg.net/divisions.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2009) (describing TWO’s
operating divisions as distribution and advertising).
138. See About: The Wolf Organization, http://www.wolforg.net/about.htm (last visited
Jan. 29, 2009) (describing the history of the Wolf Organization).
139. Id.
140. Tom Wolf, former CEO of the Wolf Organization, Presentation at Wharton
School’s Course on Strategies and Practices of Family-Controlled Companies (Apr. 15,
2008) (on file with author).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Wolf, supra note 138.
146. Id.
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30%, not all owners are family-related, as some are outside investors.147
This family culture148 must immediately be understood by any
independent director serving on the board of directors of the Wolf
Organization. If this is not clear to such director, he may constantly be
asking—to the point of annoyance—why family members, who formerly
led the business, are intent on cashing out of the business. He may
question why the business is treated more as a financial investment rather
than as a genuine heirloom to be passed from one generation to the next.
Mistaking family culture for stewardship, he may press hard for alterations
to it, unaware and uninformed that this has been a family tradition for over
150 years. Instead of helping the organization, he may in fact be hurting it.
Instead of performing a harmonizing role, he may be dividing the family
members.149 As one Illinois family consultant has stated:
“Outsiders can never know the whole history of family
resentments [or culture]; they can only be aware of the surface
issues. Part of [the] . . . job as the outsider is getting everyone on
the board on the same page. The biggest value an outsider can
bring is helping the family find consensus on a plan of action for
moving ahead.”150
In addition, a company leader who fails to learn and understand a
company’s culture and adopt it runs the risk of running the company in
contradiction to how the founders and older generation employees
envisioned.151
There is no one way by which independent directors should approach
their role in the board. It will depend upon the circumstances of the
business, its internal workings, the board politics, and primarily the
attitudes and belief system of the patriarch/matriarch and progeny. The

147. Id.
148. See Corbetta & Salvato, supra note 13, at 126 (“[T]he culture dimension measures
the degree of identification between family and business values, and the impact such values
have on the firm, as mediated from the family’s commitment to the business.”).
149. See Lansberg, supra note 87, at 2 (“Independent directors can bring a wealth of
business experience and strategic skills to the boardroom table, but without an
understanding of the interplay of family and business, the independent directors may be
truly unprepared to help resolve some of the organizational dilemmas that arise in family
enterprises. Forced to deal with those issues, they may become disillusioned and quit, or
they may become a detrimental influence, seeking to impose solutions inappropriate to the
circumstances of the system they are serving”).
150. Stone, supra note 101, at 4 (quoting Dennis Kessler, a consultant specializing in
family businesses).
151. See John A. Davis et al., Stevenson Industries (A), HARV. BUS. SCH. Note 9-802086, June 2005, at 14 (“[T]o bring in a chief operating officer who would first learn the
Stevenson culture and grow into the CEO position. Paul Steel had the track record, but the
nature of a leader in a family company is extraordinarily tricky. It’s the nuances of the
personal relationships that, in the end, make it or break it.”).
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approach must be flexible, open, communicative, and even contingent.152
A given director must understand the family culture if they are to be
effective in their servicing and advising functions.
B.

How Can Independent Directors Improve Company Stewardship?

As non-company insiders, independent directors sitting on the boards
of family-run businesses report to no one except the shareholders and the
company as a whole. They are neither subservient nor beholden to the
founder/president, and they are not necessarily friends with the heirapparent. Moreover, they are not blood relatives of any kind. Thus, they
have a very unique role in that they can serve and guide management,
curtail excessiveness, police regressive policies, and promote the interests
of the corporation. As Stone has discovered:
Governance specialists have observed that outsiders are often the
only directors willing to challenge a family company’s
leadership. In fact, [Jeff Hester, who used to run Pierce Foods
based in Winchester, Va.,] has found that he does his best work
when disagreeing with a family member. “I concentrate on
what’s best for the company,” he says. “I may side with one
person on one issue and another on a different issue, and over
time, if I’m lucky, they’ll see that I don’t play favorites. I make a
point of never repeating any ‘he said/she said’ conversations. It
takes diplomacy to explain why I see things differently, and it
takes time to develop the family’s trust.”153
Independent directors help professionalize the company. Independent
directors also add more neutrally-minded professionals and reduce conflicts
of interests (or the appearance of conflicts of interests)154 which are usually
found in close corporations. This does not mean that independent directors
are recruited precisely to contradict or disagree with the founder-CEO or
make life more difficult for him. They do not necessarily comprise a socalled “opposition party.” They are there to encourage stewardship while
creating a family-friendly atmosphere where ideas can be discussed and

152. See Corbetta & Salvato, supra note 13, at 124 (noting that differently-structured
businesses lend themselves to differently-structured boards).
153. Stone, supra note 101, at 1.
154. See Visscher, supra note 41, at 1 (“That’s why my own family business--a fourthgeneration global market leader in advanced metal transformation and coatings, based in
Belgium--is adapting our governance system to allow for greater independence and to
reduce any potential conflict of interest. For example, while most of our directors are
family members, the majority of the audit and nominating committee members are
outsiders. We also have reduced family representation on subsidiary boards. SarbanesOxley does not prohibit family members from sitting on subsidiary boards, but we have
taken extra steps to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest.”).

OSIFINAL_SIX

206

1/22/2010 5:14:57 PM

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 12:1

business plans harmonized.
As they are total outsiders to the business, it is easier for independent
directors to look inside the box from the outside. Insiders are too trapped
inside the box to wield an impartial view. Founder-CEOs are oftentimes so
immersed in operating the business that they seem to neglect the basic
question of who will succeed them in case of retirement, death, or
disability.155 Other insiders, if asked who should take over the business,
would immediately and forcefully declare “my son” or “my daughter,” or
at times, “my in-law.” The problem is that there are occasions when none
of these family members is the right fit for the job and, as a corollary, a
non-family vice president or regional manager is the best fit. In that case,
will the founder-CEO step up to the plate and declare his son, daughter, or
in-law ineligible at this time and push for the non-family vice president or
manager? Hardly, though it happens. Conversely, independent directors
will rarely have qualms about declaring the non-family manager is the best
for the position. This sort of action conforms with an independent
director’s stewardly objectives of providing objective service over selfinterest, and looking at the broad, long-term gains and values over myopic
sentimentality. With clear processes and open communications, they will
be able to succeed in their objectives even with the stubbornness of the
family, the founder, or both.
In case the family business is in the process of moving towards being
publicly-held, in alignment with stewardship, independent directors will
also play an important role. During this process the business is considered
a “threshold company,”156 and many problems may arise for which neither
the founder-CEO nor the family might be prepared. Independent directors
fulfill the roles of preceptors, technical advisers, and arbitrators.157 As
preceptors, independent directors can tutor the CEO of the family business
on how to become the CEO of a publicly-managed firm. As technical
advisors, they can show the CEO how finance, taxation, securities,
marketing, and law interact with each other.158 An outside board can serve
as an informal “court of first resort”159 when family conflicts arise.160
Though it is not their duty to meddle in family squabbles, the board may
serve as an informal forum—with the independent directors as arbitrators—

155. MGMT. CONSULTING SERVS. DIV., AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCT., ASSISTING
CLOSELY HELD BUSINESSES TO PLAN FOR SUCCESSION 21/100-1 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Acct’s. 1992).
156. Thomas L. Whisler, The Role of the Board in the Threshold Firm, 1 FAM. BUS. REV.
309, 309-10 (1988).
157. Id. at 314.
158. Id. at 314-15.
159. Id. at 315.
160. Id.
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leading to pacified discussion and face-saving.161
C.

An Advisory Body in Lieu of an Independent Board?

Family business boards are caught in a quandary: they want their
privacy yet they need outside advice and counseling. There have been
suggestions that, in order to achieve these objectives, they must get
outsiders into the picture but not directly into the policy-making. The
presence of outsiders has led to either: (1) advisory boards composed of
some outsiders which give the CEO-founder, management, and insidersonly board specific input or expertise, as needed162 or (2) advisory boards
working only with management (the founder-CEO at the helm) when there
is no board of directors.163 The latter is the result of recommendations that,
in order to eliminate potential lawsuits against directors, family businesses
of a certain size ought to reconsider their boards of directors and replace
them with advisory councils with experienced outsiders.164 It is also the
result of a family business that is not yet ready to form a board of directors
but is in need of outside expert advice.165 An advisory board—composed
of an “accountant, an attorney, the senior owner-managers, perhaps an
industry consultant, and possibly a representative of non-participating
shareholders”166 —conceptually shields the outsiders from lawsuits as it
does not represent the corporation but merely makes recommendations.
One important matter to acknowledge, however, is that “[t]he risk of legal
liability should not be a controlling element in deciding what type of board
[(formal or advisory)] is best for a family company.”167
Would putting a former or present CEO of a well-run business into the
pool of company advisors be the same as appointing him as an independent
director on the board? Can the scope of the functions of an advisory
council even compare to that of a fully functioning, non-rubberstamp board
of directors? Can advisory boards serve well as “a half-way house?”168 It
must be stated that the role of professional advisors and advisory bodies is
161. Id.
162. Charles W. Murdock, The Formal Board vs. The Advisory Board, FAM. BUS. MAG.,
Spring 1997, at 1.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2.
165. See Jonovic, supra note 102, at 125 (explaining that companies only require outside
boards when they reach a certain level of development, but may require outside advice
earlier).
166. Id.
167. Murdock, supra note 163, at 2.
168. FRED NEUBAUER & ALDEN G. LANK, THE FAMILY BUSINESS: ITS GOVERNANCE FOR
SUSTAINABILITY 99 (1998) (suggesting that an advisory board can be a compromise between
no outside influence and the actual sharing or delegating of power to people outside the
family).
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very much distinct from that of an independent director and an independent
board.169 The rules governing an advisory body or council usually state that
the advisory body does not represent the company. Rather, its activities are
merely hortatory;170 it has no enforcement power, and it serves at the
pleasure of the company CEO or president.171 Though important in some
respects, the council makes its members beholden to, if not dominated by,
the CEO or president. The members’ independence is hence called into
question.172
But the readiness of a family entity to fully accept and truly form an
effective board must be taken into consideration.173 There are family
businesses with multimillion-dollar earnings and with almost one hundred
employees but which may not yet be ready to have a board.174 Specifically,
the owner-managers may not yet be prepared to handle the balancing nature
and advising function of an independent body such as a board of
directors.175 Boards cannot be forced upon a company; that would itself be
coercive and draconian. Closely-held companies and their founder-CEOs
must be convinced, gradually over time, to wholeheartedly accept into the
fold a governing board. Lasting change does not happen overnight.
Forming a competent board does not happen in a week.
It must be explained to the founding family that a board can
potentially work wonders for the enterprise. The founding family’s call for
privacy should be balanced with the need for informed, active, flexible, and
fiscalizing directors inside the board. Professional advisors, such as
retained law firms, accountants and auditors, management consultants, and
the like, are not in a position to effect real and substantial change. Even
assuming their assistance was sought in the first place, they are mere
recommenders of appropriate action.176 Usually, the boards receive written
reports from advisory bodies or outside professionals and make their
decisions based on these reports. A fully independent director who
negotiates, mediates, clarifies, discusses, and rationally disagrees with
managing family members ought to be recognized differently from a mere
recommender of action.
Oftentimes, founder-CEOs need to be exposed to independent director
169. See Murdock, supra note 163, at 2 (stating that unlike an independent board which
has final authority for the management of a corporation, an advisory board serves at the
discretion of the CEO).
170. NEUBAUER & LANK, supra note 169, at 100-02.
171. See Murdock, supra note 163, at 2 (contending that the bylaws of an advisory board
often state that the board has no power).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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positions themselves in order to recognize the importance of independence
and the wisdom independent directors bring to the table. If a founder-CEO
is tapped to serve as an independent professional in another family
company’s advisory body, he or she will soon realize that the group is just
advisory and wields no substantial power.177 The founder-CEO might find
it useless to be sitting in a seemingly lame-duck post and may resign
eventually.178 If the founder-CEO is tasked to be an independent director,
on the other hand, he or she will find value and fulfillment in the position
as he or she is able to help guide the business. He or she may perhaps be
encouraged later on to add independent directors179 to his or her own
board,180 assuming he or she has none. If the reality, however, is that the
company is ill-prepared at the moment for a formal board, then an advisory
council or “review council,”181 may be the next best option.182
D.

When Should Independent Directors Take Their Seats?

Before this particular question is answered, it must be asked, “When
should a board of directors first be constituted?” John M. Nash, founder
and President Emeritus of the National Association of Corporate Directors
(NACD), recommended that business owners who never had an active
board (most likely start-ups or even long-established businesses that simply
saw no need to create a board) might want to begin the process by creating
an advisory board, as opposed to starting with a full-fledged board of

177. See id. (contending that the stereotypical family board ratifies almost all of a CEO’s
actions).
178. Id.
179. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 1-14 (discussing the history of the family-run
business founded by Sam Steinberg). Lawyers, like any professionals, would be great
contributors as independent directors. Id. If the lawyer’s firm is not consulting with or
retained by the company, and the lawyer is not linked by blood or employment, then he or
she can perfectly fit the role as an outsider to the board. Id. He or she can provide great
legal advice, guide the company as to where it can go and where not to go, and update the
directors on current developments in law. Id. He or she can help iron out succession issues,
the family charter, reincorporation matters, acquisitions or mergers, and other business
decisions that would need legal expertise. Id. He or she can assist in taxation issues as well.
Id. An example would be the personal attorney of Sam Steinberg who once sat as a director
of the board of the then-dominant Steinberg’s supermarket chain in Quebec. Id. But it must
be pointed out that he sat as a grey director (he was then employed by Sam Steinberg) and
not as an independent one. Id.
180. Id.
181. Jonovic, supra note 103, at 125, 135-36. Jonovic, as early as 1989, cautioned about
abruptly instituting a formal board in an unprepared family business atmosphere. Id. at 127.
He notes that boards can fail through “misplaced diplomacy,” “inappropriate direction,”
“presumed synergy” or “infallibility.” Id. at 130-31.
182. See Powell, supra note 30, at 9 (discussing the preference by some companies to
establish an advisory board, rather than a formal board).
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directors.183 Other than avoidance of liability,184 an advisory board may be
a good start for business owners who fear that a board with outside
directors might unduly interfere with their decisions. An advisory board
can easily evolve into a full board with monitoring capabilities, once the
business owners realize that the board is not a threat, but rather, a
complement to the entity and the owner’s business goals.185 Ideally, instead
of treating the board as a threatening structure, founders should regard a
board as a “deliberative peer body”186 which serves as “a conscience, a
memory, a forum, and a support system. . . . [F]amily companies . . .
[should] realize that having outside directors can be an enormous asset in
achieving the owners’ dreams and strategic objectives.”187
There is a lot of truth in Nash’s pronouncements. However, there is
equally as much truth in the argument that it may also be in the best interest
of the family-run company for the founder-CEO to constitute a board of
directors in the early stages of founding the business. This decision will
have to be reached based on several factors already enumerated, such as the
preparedness of the founder-CEO to receive outside advice, the
circumstances of the business, and the openness of the business family.188
An early board will presumably help resolve early pains. A forced board is
certainly going to be a mocked board: the founder may treat the board as
though it does not exist or may even fail to call a meeting. If the founder
realizes the merits of a board very early in the corporate history and is not
constrained or threatened with directorial advising and check-and-balance
prerogatives (as was the case of the Gravely sisters of Vietri, Inc.), then the
business will ultimately benefit.189 Mathile describes, in a self-confessing
article, his earlier hesitation about immediately forming a formal board
when he acquired control of a company,190 but he knew he needed help.
After committing the mistake of anointing a board of cronies, he
subsequently fired them and constituted a truly independent body which
gave him sound advice and served as his confidants.191
In the event that such founder does not see it fit that a board ought to
be constituted very soon after he organizes the business or just after he

183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Murdock, supra note 163, at 1 (discussing the various forms of “peer bodies,”
which include a legal board and an advisory board).
187. Fischer & Stevenson, supra note 102, at 2.
188. Powell, supra note 30, at 9; Murdock, supra note 163, at 1-4.
189. See Stone, supra note 106, at 1-2 (suggesting that the Gravely’s business was
successful from its inception, in part, because it had an experienced board of directors).
190. Clayton L. Mathile, A Business Owner’s Perspective on Outside Boards, 1 FAM.
BUS. REV. 223, 231 (Sept. 1988).
191. Id. at 231-34.
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makes his first few sales, then at the very least a board must be constituted
when it is in the process of professionalization.192 This is, in Jonovic’s
view, the point of “significant evolution” and “threshold phase” which
comprises formalized shareholder agreements, agreements on goals and
business objectives, accurate accounting information, and a strong,
coordinated middle management.193 Alexander also notes that, other than
the period of professionalization, boards should be constituted once the
company reaches the point when the first non-employee shareholder
appears.194 Boards may also be constituted after the formation of a family
council and the drafting of a family constitution.195
In preparation for a board, other than ego-readiness of the founderCEO, businesses must develop a board manual196 containing everything
from business history, shareholder expectations, remuneration, meetings,
directorial expectations, time commitments, and committees.197 Directors
must likewise be screened, interviewed, and selected well.198
Normally, once a business institutes a board of directors, the board
will initially be filled with insiders—in other words, family members and
close friends.199 Sam Stevenson of Stevenson Industries, despite professing
his commitment to managerial professionalism, started the practice of
appointing non-family external board members, who happened to be his
father’s attorney and his own childhood sailing buddies.200 This may be
192. See Jonovic, supra note 102, at 1 (suggesting that once a business is truly set up as a
going concern, an independent board of directors should be put in place to provide an
objective long-term view of the business).
193. See id. (“A board does not become important or potentially effective until the
company is well through the ‘threshold’ transition between entrepreneurial venture and
professional management.”).
194. Alexander, supra note 39.
195. See CRUZ, supra note 14, at 74 (noting a family business’ readiness to implement a
board of directors in spite of continuing management by family members).
196. Gardner W. Heidrick, Selecting Outside Directors, 1 FAM. BUS. REV. 271, 273
(Sept. 1988).
197. Id. at 275.
198. See Fischer & Stevenson, supra note 102, at 3-5 (suggesting that a rigorous
selection process for directors is critical to selecting the right board).
199. See Stone, supra note 106, at 4 (discussing how the successful Gravely sisters, who
founded Vietri, Inc., initially turned to their friends to sit on the company’s first board of
directors).
200. Davis & LaChapelle, supra note 36, at 3-5. This is quite unfortunate since external,
non-family board members should be as far divorced from the family as possible. Id.
However, his father’s lawyer and his own childhood sailing friends were too close to the
family and to him. Id. This may have called into question his adherence to avoid nepotism
and his commitment to strict professionalism. Id. More particularly, in 1986, the board of
Stevenson Industries was composed of three family members, three company executives,
and three non-family outsiders (the family lawyer and Sam’s two childhood sailing friends).
Id. This meant that all nine board members were either insiders or grey directors with no
independent director at all. Id. The situation improved in the 1990s. Id.
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because of the trust the family had in them and the way by which they were
selected and appointed. If a board is made up primarily (or exclusively) of
family members or childhood friends, little effort for the selection and the
appointment of directors is needed. The sad reality, however, is that this
type of board does not perpetuate the business and may lead to its abrupt
conclusion.201 Arbitrariness may be the name of the game. If a board is to
be constituted, it must either be a completely independent one or stacked
with as many independent directors as possible.202 The more independent
directors, the better it is for the company; the more inside family members,
the worse it is for the business.203
When should family boards have independent directors? Is there a
dollar amount or business size that must be attained before the owners
engage independent directors? The most opportune time for the entry of
independent directors is the time the board is constituted, or at least “the
sooner, the better.”204 For sure, businesses will first want their own kin to
be on the board; this is human nature and quite understandable.205
Humorously, Jonovic writes that most business owners prefer insiders as
directors since this makes it a “nice, comfortable board, chosen from a
wide range of hangers-on, non-entities, and relatives . . . [typically
consisting] of Him (he’s The Boss, after all), his spouse (who won’t ask
embarrassing questions), and someone—most often an attorney/friend—
who writes up the minutes (of the meetings he never holds).”206 Jonovic
surmises that independent directors should be added when the company is
reasonably successful, when there is a stable management structure, and
managers and advisors are competent. Also, the boss has “gotta wanna”
add independent directors.207 After a reasonable amount of time from the
inception of the board, independent directors must come in.208 Waiting too
long will act as a self-insulation device for the founder to do whatever he or

201. Id.
202. See Gerald Le Van, The Real Value of Outsiders on the Board, FAM. BUS. MAG.,
June 1990, at 1-2 (contending that independent directors can provide the CEO of a family
business with the best advice on important decisions).
203. See generally Schwartz & Barnes, supra note 84, at 279-80 (examining the findings
of a study of CEO attitudes towards inside and outside board members).
204. Id. at 284.
205. See DONALD JONOVIC, THE SECOND-GENERATION BOSS: A SUCCESSOR’S GUIDE TO
BECOMING THE NEXT OWNER-MANAGER OF A SUCCESSFUL FAMILY BUSINESS 174 (1982)
(providing multiple explanations for business owners’ preferences for family members on
directorial boards).
206. Id.
207. See id. at 175-76 (contending that the effectiveness of a director depends on the
owner’s willingness to consider and utilize the board’s recommendations) (emphasis
omitted).
208. Id.
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she pleases and to buy whatever he or she wants.209 Keeping outsiders off
the board may just be a personal vanity of the founder at the expense of
business survival.210 By the time the independent directors finally arrive,
the place may already be a big mess.
E.

Contra-Indications to Independence

There are some family companies that do not have an independent
board211—in fact, they may not have a real board at all, but rather a
fictitious or paper one just to satisfy the requirements of the IRS and
protect the corporate shell.212 This plan is not beneficial for the business or
the shareholders. If the board of directors exists only on paper, or if the
concept of a board is not taken seriously, a host of problems may surface
later. There are many reasons that family companies object to an
independent board. The founder-CEO may not want a real board because
he or she may not want to share power, cultivate potential critics (no matter
how constructive) to his or her leadership style and non-inclusiveness, train
and educate board members, or have board interference.213 Years of having
“paper boards” will also harden the resolve of this founder-CEO when he
or she is placed in a situation, perhaps based on the rapid expansion of the
company, where outside advice is necessary through a formal board.214 He
or she may end up nominally appointing a board, but never treating the
directors with the respect that they deserve as conscientious fiscalizers or
fiscal managers.215 Even worse, he or she may not listen to them at all.216

209. See Davis, supra note 50, 1 (stating that most family company managers do not
want an independent board because they want to be free from board interference when
making decisions).
210. See Le Van, supra note 203, 1-2 (suggesting that an inside board may not really
challenge the CEO of a family-run business).
211. See Davis, supra note 50, at 1 (discussing the circumstances that give rise to the
need for family-owned companies to form an outside board; in contrast, an “inside board” is
composed of only family members, close family friends, professional advisers with
contractual relations with the company, and past or present employees); Schwartz & Barnes,
supra note 84, at 272 (noting a survey of family-owned business CEOs that found that the
majority of respondents had boards composed exclusively of insiders).
212. Davis, supra note 50, at 1.
213. See Murdock, supra note 163, 1-3 (discussing the distinction between a formal
board and an advisory board).
214. Alexander, supra note 39.
215. Id.
216. See Clarke, supra note 12, at 2 (recommending that directors develop a thorough
understanding of the family owners’ values, goals and plans to avoid being ignored by the
owners). Board members must determinedly persist without being obnoxiously offensive,
and must have, not an ounce of patience, but an entire army of patience and stamina. Id.
This patience is what Clarke calls Patience Quotient (PQ) which is definitely much longer
than in publicly traded companies. Id.
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If a corporation has been run solely, yet successfully, by the founderentrepreneur for the last twenty or so years, the sudden formation of a
board of directors may make him or her cringe at the prospect of power
divestiture, leading to a board in form but not in substance.217 By the time
the founder finally creates an independent board, he or she most likely has
already morphed into a recalcitrant, unbending, and uncompromising
tyrant,218 whom Sonnenfeld describes as a “[m]onarch.”219 Such tyrants,
unappreciative of board independence, do not know how to “[pull] back
from involvement,” or “[assess] with detachment,” or even “[learn] not to
be.”220
If a formal board is constituted, but only sporadically and
discretionarily listened to by the founder, or coerced to agree to preordained executive decisions, then the directors become ineffectual.221 It
turns the governance institution into a mere rubberstamp,222 clearly at the
beck and call of the founder. If the independent directors allow themselves
to be intimidated or dominated by the founder, then they metamorphose
into empty, ceremonial figures—names that management can trumpet as
independent voices that are actually muffled, stifled mutes.
Another contra-indication to independence would be secret, non-board

217. Murdock, supra note 163, at 1-2.
218. See Le Van, supra note 203, at 1-2 (using a hypothetical CEO of a family-owned
business to demonstrate the advantages of having outsiders as board members). Longserving founder-CEOs often confuse themselves with their business legacies. Id. They are
often unyielding and do not appreciate being challenged. Id. In reality, no one dares
challenge him or her, not his or her son, lawyer, and certainly not his or her accountant. Id.
His or her consultants do all his or her biddings. Id. No one would want to push him or her
back. Id. This makes him or her a tyrant. Id.
219. JEFFREY SONNENFELD, The Hero’s Reluctant Farewell, in THE HERO’S FAREWELL:
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN CEOS RETIRE 58, 70-71 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998). According to
Sonnenfeld, as one of the CEO’s departure styles, “[m]onarchs do not leave office until they
are decisively forced out through the death of the chief executive or through an internal
palace revolt. This palace revolt may be in the form of ultimatums, the resignations of top
officers, or the action of the board of directors.” Id. at 70. Other departure styles include
that of the “general” who leaves office marked by a similar coercive exit; he “plots his
return and quickly comes back to office” since he believes that he needs to save it from the
hands of the incompetent successor. Id. Another style is the “ambassador,” which is the
Stewardship practicing type. Id. at 70-71. Ambassadors peacefully and timely leave office,
serve as mentors to the next-in-line CEO, and may remain on the board but are not out to
“sabotage the successor.” Id. at 71. Lastly, “governors rule for a limited term” and abruptly
shift to other outlets of leadership, but seldom return to help or maintain contact with the
firm. Id. Governors can be compared to CEOs who serve for two to four years after getting
the boot or resigning, they totally cut off any connection with the firm (of course after
getting a hefty golden parachute and related emoluments). Id.
220. Renato Tagiuri, Life Stages and Their Tasks, Harv. Univ. VII8-10, at 1-2.
221. See DYER, supra note 4, 67 (claiming that the role and function of the board must be
established).
222. Id.
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decisions made by key family members that are subsequently attempted to
be rammed down the throats of the board.223 An accepted reality in the
family business situation is that key family members may want to retain
control even if they are not part of management or are not board
members.224 In collusion with the person in charge, whether it be the
founder, CEO, or an older generation’s former leader, some important
family members may devise plans or make decisions behind the back of the
duly constituted board and then try to run these decisions through the
board.225 Independent boards must immediately see these things from afar
and prevent them from being passed on as board decisions.226 Undermining
legally constituted boards may be a way to retain or attain power by family
members who were either bypassed or are in a current family struggle.227
Boards must not fall prey to these schemes, as they contradict the very
foundation of what independence is all about.
IV. ADVANTAGES OF A MAJORITY OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
As stated earlier, founder-CEOs tend to be very subjective and fail to
look at themselves properly in the mirror.228 They tend to believe that what
they are doing is always, or almost always, right.229 There is usually
nobody there to constructively criticize them, and no one from the officer’s
group is willing to stick his or her neck out to challenge the legitimacy or
viability of the decision of “the grand old man.”230 If the founder-CEO
thinks a large competitor should be bought, this deal will most likely push
through, barring any antitrust issues.231 If he or she perceives it a proper
time to invest in domestic or foreign companies, be they related and
strategic or otherwise, then most likely no one will be able to pull him or
her back.232

223. See generally Davis, supra note 73, at 1 (discussing the implications of an
agreement between brothers in a partnership that, when enacted by a newly formed board,
threatened to destroy the partnership).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See Le Van, supra note 203, at 1-2 (arguing that even successful CEOs of family
businesses need help from advisors in making big, risky decisions).
229. Id.
230. Id. See Hamilton Nolan, The Old Men of Media Moguldom, THE HUFFINGTON
POST, July 8, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/07/08/the-old-men-of-mediamogu_n_111496.html (affirming elderly CEOs’ desire to work until they die and the
inability of younger counterparts to intervene).
231. Roberts, supra note 17, at 3-4.
232. Id. See John Cook, Murdoch Buys Brooklyn Paper, GAWKER, Mar. 10, 2009,
http://gawker.com/5167657/murdoch-buys-brooklyn-paper (questioning Murdoch’s decision
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Hence, the adoption of active, strong, well-informed, and independent
boards can easily be justified by the founder-CEO’s inability to know either
the company’s limits or his or her personal limits.233 Independent boards
are well suited to rein in the founder-CEO at the precise moment, and to
provide timely and sagely advice when the CEO is out of control or
excessively reckless.234 Insider directors, usually family members, will
generally not have the temerity to clarify, much less duel, with the founderCEO.235 They will typically submit to the founder-CEO’s wishes to the
detriment of the family business and its shareholders, either because of
family culture, their own narrow self-interest, or passivity.236 In certain
situations, the contrary is true: a younger brother, daughter, or son may be
continuously fighting with “the grand old man,” chastising him for the
littlest or most trivial things, and imputing malice to every move.237
Independent boards may be able to bridge the widening gap between
shareholder interests and the egocentricity of the founder-CEO, and
perhaps even the gap between “the grand old man” and his rival kin.238
According to Fischer and Stevenson, independent boards lead to “increased
professionalism and accountability; greater credibility with the company’s
various stakeholders; a clearer sense of corporate mission and strategy;
access to top-quality advice at a fraction of the cost of consulting firms; and
broader perspective on top-level policy decisions.”239
Considering the many advantages of independent boards, the selection
of independent directors is critical. Family friends, next-of-kin, sailing
buddies, or childhood best friends should simply not make the cut; neither
should retired company managers, individuals who serve on a very large
number of boards, and even professional consultants who have conflicting
interests.240 There are many important criteria to consider in selecting an
independent director in a family business.241 The following represents a
partial list:
to buy Brooklyn Paper).
233. See Le Van, supra note 203, 1-2 (noting the value and desirability of boards
composed of experienced outside directors).
234. Id.
235. Id. On the other extreme, they may be dueling all the time, which also demonstrates
the need for independent boards. See Davis, supra note 73, at 1 (noting that a board can
serve to comfort a family CEO who is constantly criticized by his family).
236. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 3-4 (discussing the history of the business founded by
Sam Steinberg).
237. See Raymond, supra note 79, at 1-7 (recounting a retired family CEO’s struggles
with his unyielding and demanding father, when the father was president and the son was a
sales manager).
238. Id.
239. Fischer & Stevenson, supra note 102, at 9-10.
240. NEUBAUER & LANK, supra note 169, at 115-16.
241. Le Van, supra note 203, at 1-2.
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1.Need for integrity, honesty, commitment, professionalism, and
a strong sense of service;242
2.Not conflicted in that he or she has no prior or present business
ties with the company, and is not related by blood by a
reasonable number of degrees;243
3.Has run or is running a successful family-run or publicly-held
business (to add quality to the board and to the corporation as a
whole);244
4.Does not need to have absolute expertise in the industry or
know the day-to-day operations of the company (in fact, the
independent director ideally should not have operational
knowledge or expertise in the same industry where the business
operates);245
5.Possession of a clear understanding of people, their basic
psychology, the concept of familiar relations and interactions,
and general working relationships (with emphasis on the
idiosyncrasies of the founder-CEO);246
6.Open to understanding the basic history of the company,
transition problems in the past, and the interplay between the
founder and his children;247
7.Embodiment of stewardship, particularly in succession
issues;248
8.An empowering attitude and outlook—particularly for
leadership succession and life in general;249
9.A congenial, mentoring persona;250
10.The right skills and expertise, such as “core technologies,
research and development, marketing, and finance,” 251
depending on the company’s current state of business252—
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See Stone, supra note 101, at 2 (discussing how the CEO of a family business used
his experiences on the board of a different company to develop general criteria for choosing
individuals to serve on the board of his own company).
246. Alexander, supra note 39.
247. See Le Van, supra note 203, at 1-2 (arguing that insiders, such as the founder’s
children, should not sit on the board, but should attend board meetings in an educational
capacity).
248. Sydney Finkelstein & Eric M. Jackson, An Early-warning System to Guard Against
Failure, FAM. BUS. MAG., Winter 2007, at 2-3; Robert C. Elliott, A Process for Managing
Wealth and Well-being, FAM. BUS. MAG., Winter 2008, at 1-3.
249. James H. Biteman, Franklin Harris & Sons, Inc., Harv. Bus. Sch. Note 9-377-019,
1976, at 1.
250. See Fischer & Stevenson, supra note 102, at 5 (asserting that directors of family
businesses should be willing to mentor the owner’s children to minimize intergenerational
tensions).
251. Davis, supra note 50, at 2.
252. Fischer & Stevenson, supra note 102, at 3-4. For example, when the company is in
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essentially, boards should have the right mix of directors;253
11.Emotional Intelligence (EQ);254
12.Leadership, crisis experience,255 sensitivity to family and
business conflicts, ability to actively listen, and the resolve to act
as mediator or counselor if the situation calls for it;256
13.Sufficient chemistry with the founder-CEO and other board
members;257
14.Willingness to undergo periodic or annual assessment and
performance survey; and
15.Willingness to follow a duly crafted board or company
manual.258
A.

Deadlock Breakers, Mediators and Conflict Managers

One of the risks that independent directors must expect is that there
will be long histories of family bonding as well as conflicts, which they
will never entirely know about.259 An outsider and a stranger to the internal
workings of the family, he or she is propelled into a position that may
appear very formal and amiable in the boardroom, but may actually be

the process of going public, it will be useful for someone on the board with experience in
that area. Id. The independent director need not be a securities lawyer or a former fund
manager. Id. However, he or she needs to have a thorough understanding of the mechanics
and requirements of going public to help the company successfully enter the world of
publicly-held enterprise. Id.
253. Id. More important than the size of the board is its mix of talents, experience, and
personalities. Id. To be effective, a board must operate as a balanced system with healthy
group dynamics. Id. Each individual’s personal and professional qualities must be aligned
with the company’s strategic objectives. Id. The ideal directors are neither dominant nor
reticent. Id. They are candid yet tactful and always mindful that the role of a director is to
help the owner of the business realize his or her dreams. Id.
254. Id. They need to have a fine sense of boundaries that enables them to know when
the board should get involved and when it should not. Many issues that arise are close calls.
Where to draw the line becomes especially problematic if there is no process like a family
council to deal with issues arising in the business that affect the family. This kind of
boundary management is a question not only of when to get involved, but also of when to
exert influence. Id.
255. See Cohn, supra note 136, at 2 (arguing that board members must be able to
competently minimize the negative impact of unexpected problems).
256. See Davis, supra note 50, at 2 (stating “board members have to know when to push
and when to back off; they must be skilled at depersonalizing discussion of sensitive
issues.”); see also Edwin A. Hoover & Colette Lombard Hoover, Ethical Dilemmas of
Right-vs.-Right, FAM. BUS. MAG., Autumn 1997, at 4-7 (discussing foundational principles
that can help a mediator resolve generational disputes in a family business situation).
257. Davis, supra note 50, at 2. For Davis, this is a “make-or-break criteria.” Id.
258. Jayne A. Pearl, Dealing with Dissent, FAM. BUS. MAG., Winter 2007, at 7.
259. See Edwin T. Crego Jr., When to Get Involved in a Family Conflict, FAM. BUS.
MAG., Mar. 1990, at 1-3 (stating that there are both conflicts that only the immediate family
is aware about and ones in which outside mediation is sought to help resolve the issue).
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running berserk due to long-standing family disagreements.260 Even before
the independent director accepts the task, he or she must ask himself or
herself whether he or she has the patience, the stamina, the skills, and the
fortitude to do well as an outsider.261 The independent director may be
accused of bias along the way, may get sued in the process, and may be
unsavorily dismissed as inept.262
One drawback of being an independent director is that one may be
perceived as too independent from the wishes of the family. His or her
actions may be interpreted as a revolt against the family.263 For example, in
one family business board comprised of seven directors (four independents,
two insider-family members, and an outsider CEO-director), the four
independents voted to hire a headhunter to look for a worthy CEO
successor; this action did not sit well with the two insider-family directors
because they wanted one of their own to head the company.264 This
“revolt” ended with a legal ploy consisting of the institution of a Family
Business Council that mobilized thirty (30) or so family shareholders, the
resignation of the four independent directors, and the election of one of the
family members as CEO.265 Though some may perceive this as a blow to
the notion of independent directors in family-run businesses, in fact it is
not—the independent directors simply performed their role as emotionally
detached, neutral, and objective board members. As conflict managers,
these four independent directors may have felt that resigning (because they
stuck to their conviction that an outsider is a better successor) was the best
way to resolve the conflict. Even with this “revolt” scenario, the consultant
who advised the family to set up the Family Business Council stated that it
is important for family boards to include independents as “[t]hey can bring
in fresh ideas and objectivity, and often can defuse potential conflict among
family members.”266 Indeed, if the independent director is up to the
challenge, he or she can provide perspective, neutrality, and objectivity that

260. See Peter Davis, Taming the Emotions that Upset Business, FAM. BUS. MAG., Dec.
1990, at 1-4 (noting that personal family emotions can negatively affect a business).
261. See Leon Danco, Where to Find Top Talent for Your Dream Board, FAM. BUS.
MAG., Winter 1996, at 1-4 (stating that many of the qualities needed for an independent
board member of a family company can be found in board members of large public
companies).
262. See Powell, supra note 30, at 1 (noting that an independent director may be sued by
a disgruntled family member who is a shareholder in the family business).
263. See Kevin McManus, Whose Company is This Anyway?, FAM. BUS. MAG., Feb.
1990, at 1-7 (noting that a statement by an outside director that Challenge Machinery Co.
would no longer be a family company was a misstep because it was seen by the two family
board members as “fighting words”).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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the family sorely lacks.267
One of the independent director’s roles, although it will not appear in
any written formal responsibilities, is to act as a deadlock breaker.268 Often
a situation arises where the patriarch-owner will not agree with the
suggestions of his son or daughter (the successor-in-waiting), and it will be
up to the independent directors to display magnanimity, professional
maturity, and grace under pressure in order to quell a potential uprising.269
Consider a situation where the patriarch-owner wants to fire a vice
president whom the son or daughter considers a friend and a talented coworker. It is up to the independent directors on the board to vote according
to their conscience and break the impasse. This responsibility is of course
shared with insider directors as well.270 If the board decides to side with the
father, it is the role of the independent directors to explain to the son or
daughter, who just walked out of the room and threatened to resign, as to
why they voted that way.271 Perhaps their vote is explainable by their
intrinsic wisdom not to directly pit the father against the son or daughter.272
Had they voted in favor of the son or daughter, there may have been
tremendous, deleterious consequences, such as the father radically
declaring the sale of the company.273 Whatever vote they cast, as deadlock
breakers, independents must be able to soothe the relationship of the family
leadership.274 They likewise ought to provide better perspective to founderowners who have created a “legend” status for themselves,275 which almost

267. Id.; see All You Need to Ask When Hiring a Consultant, FAM. BUS. MAG., Autumn
1994, at 1-13 (noting that the independent director’s objective nature and neutrality should
reflect, if not surpass, that of professional advisors and consultants specifically advising
family-run businesses).
268. See Kelin E. Gersick, What's in April's Best Interest?, FAM. BUS. MAG., Spring
1995, at 1-13 (noting that in a family business board composed of a divorced man, his
former wife, and a third person, the third person-director was compelled to decide the fate of
the business when the divorced man got an offer to sell the print business--a move that was
very much objected to by his former wife); see also Ivan Lansberg, One for All and All for
One, FAM. BUS. MAG., Autumn 1995, at 3 (commenting that in Europe, the mediator or
deadlock breaker is known as a “nonfamily consiglieri who is given considerable authority
to help manage rivalries and disagreements”).
269. See Clayton P. Alderfer, Understanding and Consulting to Family Business Boards,
BUS.
REV.
249,
252
(1988),
available
at
1
FAM.
http://fbr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/1/3/249
(discussing
interpersonal
and
professional dynamics of family boards and role of independent directors within this
context).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 252-53.
272. Id. at 253.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Richard Salomon, Setting a Standard for Future Generations, FAM. BUS. MAG.,
Summer 2005, at 2.
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always leads to the subjugated status of their next-in-line kin.276
Independent directors can also act as mediators of family and business
strife. According to Taguiri, one way to break out of old, unproductive
interaction patterns is to “[p]ut a buffer person between”277 the feuding
family members.278 This could be the mother, a distant aunt, a grandfathercum-founder, or even a long-serving non-family executive.279 As trust
catalysts, these individuals may be able to allay dissidence and foster
harmony in the family and in the business.280 Other than these insiders or
family members, independent directors may themselves be mediators.
They need not be playing the mediating director role only during the
quarterly board meetings; they can also easily do so when the father or the
son calls upon them for private suggestions or revelation of confidences.281
They must rationally explain to whoever is seeking their guidance that
people must generally “[a]ccept some differences in [each other’s]
objectives.”282 Independents must also realize that they cannot “expect two
highly rivalrous personalities to work well together”283 and should bear this
in mind when trying to understand the differences between them284 in the
hopes of seeking resolution. On a wider scale, the board as a whole must
be a reliable mediator.285 Ward postulates that a board of directors is a
“mediating mechanism”286 that will be useful in conflict resolution.
B.

Forestalling Oppression and the Excesses of the Controlling
Shareholder

There is a saying that tyranny breeds tyranny. It has been said that
“the atrocities of the demagogues and the re-establishment of successive
tyrannies in France can be explained in terms of the moral and intellectual
depravity of the populace prior to the Revolution, a depravity caused,
again, by centuries of misrule and superstition.”287 In other words, a tyrant
276. Id.
277. Tagiuri, supra note 221, at 1.
278. Id.
279. See Lansberg, supra note 87, at 2 (noting the need for the independent director to be
involved in the selection process of a successor to ease family tensions).
280. Id.
281. Heidrick, supra note 197, at 271.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See David Keirsey, Different Drummers, in PLEASE UNDERSTAND ME II 1, 1-3
(1998) (examining how people are fundamentally different in ways that are not easily
changed).
285. See WARD, supra note 15, at 157 (analyzing the challenges of maintaining the longterm health of a family-run business).
286. Id.
287. CIAN DUFFY, SHELLY AND THE REVOLUTIONARY SUBLIME 130 (2005).
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who has been ruling a certain country or fiefdom risks, with his life and
limbs, that, upon his overthrow, he shall be strung up the way Mussolini
was summarily executed and his body hung upside down in Milan for
public viewing; or the way Romania’s erstwhile dictator Nicolae Ceausescu
was overthrown and executed after a two-hour kangaroo trial during the
bloody Romanian Revolution of 1989.
As applied to the tyranny of a family founder such as Sumner
Redstone,288 he of course will not suffer exactly the same physical fate as
past political tyrants; however, he may suffer something similar. If he
oppresses and dominates a sibling, a son, or a daughter too excessively
during the length of his leadership, the successor may implement the same
or comparable viciousness when the founder is finally led out of the
boardroom. This could translate to the possible abrogation of his long-term
policies, a drastic change of corporate vision, selling off profitable
subsidiaries, firing of his pet people, discontinuation of favorite products
and services, and the like. It may well be said that he is at least
metaphorically being hanged upside down. If the successor does not take
revenge on the founder’s legacy, he may do so on the employees and senior
managers, and the cycle of tyranny continues. Ward has stated that
“[m]any successors . . . rebel against past business practices instead of
trying to understand them . . . [and] eagerly propose new systems, seeking
to introduce changes that reflect their own identity.”289
It is better that oppression by a past generation does not carry over to
oppression by the current and future generation. But corporate excesses,
misjudgments, and mishandlings are quite common in family-run
enterprises,290 especially since the founder thinks he can do absolutely
anything, as it is his business.291 Sumner Redstone, at eighty-four years old
and still the chairman and controlling shareholder of Viacom, Inc., has
allegedly been trying to force his daughter, Shari off the Viacom board.292
This comes after Shari and Sumner united to force Sumner’s son, Brent off
the board of the family’s privately-held movie theater chain, National
Amusements.293 Brent Redstone has since sued his father and National

288. See infra note 297 (discussing the Redstone family dispute).
289. WARD, supra note 15, at 199.
290. See MILLER & BRETON-MILLER, supra note 3, at 12 (summarizing related research
by scholars relating to mismanagement in family businesses).
291. Louis B. Barnes, Precista Tools AG (A), HARV. BUS. SCH. Note 9-488-046, 1989, at
3-4.
292. Sarah Gilbert, Heir Apparent: Shari and 'Daddy Dearest' Sumner Redstone,
BLOGGINGSTOCKS, Mar. 21, 2008, http://www.bloggingstocks.com/2008/03/21/heirapparent-shari-and-daddy-dearest-sumner-redstone/.
293. Peter Cohan, Will Irascible Old Monster Sumner Redstone Sell Viacom?,
BLOGGINGSTOCKS, July 19, 2007, http://www.bloggingstocks.com/2007/07/19/willirascible-old-monster-sumner-redstone-sell-viacom/.
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Amusements, seeking the dissolution of Viacom and CBS.294 Brent also
accused Sumner Redstone, the legendary founder, of favoring his sister and
excluding him in important business decisions.295 This family squabble has
since been resolved, at least for the time being.296 When Sumner Redstone
leaves office, either voluntarily, removed by board pressure (such as
Michael Eisner’s resignation from Disney some years back after a lengthy
litigation and extreme pressure),297 or escorted by an undertaker, it is
unknown what Shari and Brent will do. If Shari or Brent is chosen to
succeed him, will he or she sell bits and pieces of the company for
immediate liquidity? Will he or she share or forsake their father’s vision?
Will he or she sell Viacom, Inc. after it has achieved so much? Will they
retaliate against the iron-hand hegemony of their father, and if so, to what
extent?
These questions seem to have no answers at present. It may very well
be that, upon his exit, Sumner’s heirs/successors will lead the company in a
fair, democratic, ethical, and stewardly manner. But it is too early to tell,
as “the grand old man” appears to have some years left.298 What is
interesting is what the Viacom board is doing (or not doing). Conceptually,
the board should be able to curtail such excesses from the founding parent,
as well as temper the probable retaliation or vindictiveness by the successor
once he or she assumes the top post. Of the eleven members of the Viacom
board, four certainly are insiders, while seven appear to be independent
directors.299 What can they concretely do to ensure that there is adequate
succession planning, a smooth transition period, and that oppression and
tyranny are avoided? This is an independent board, is it not? The
independent directors are bound, particularly under Viacom’s Corporate
Governance Guidelines (revised December 2007) to “make independent,
analytical inquiries . . . [and] should exhibit practical wisdom and mature
judgment . . . . A majority of Viacom’s directors will meet the criteria for
294. CNNMoney.com Staff, Redstone's Son Sues Family-Run Firm, CNNMONEY.COM,
Feb. 15, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/02/15/ news/newsmakers/redstone/.
295. Jenn Abelson, The Redstone Saga: Falling Out Puts Future of Cinema Chains Run
From Dedham in Doubt, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1, 2007, available at
http://www.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2007/08/01/the_redstone_saga/.
296. Greg Griffin, Redstones Settle Feud Over Family Business, DENVERPOST.COM, Feb.
6, 2007, available at http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_5164430.
297. The Associated Press, Eisner Resigns from Disney Board of Directors,
USATODAY.COM, Oct. 6, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/media/200510-06-eisner-board_x.htm.
298. Joe Flint and Tiffany Hsu, Sumner Redstone Dodges a Grilling, LOS ANGELES
TIMES,
Apr.
30,
2009,
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-ct-milken302009apr30,0,1461293.story.
299. Viacom,
Inc.
Board
of
Directors,
available
at
http://www.viacom.com/aboutviacom/Pages/boardofdirectors.aspx (last visited May 1,
2008).
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independence established by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
corporate governance listing standards.”300 But are these independent
directors too powerless to do anything against the bull-strong founder?301
Though any prognosis now may seem specious at best, the Viacom board,
despite its independence, is not a good model of family business
governance. The board has certainly achieved many important things in
other areas, but it has failed to keep in check the excesses of the majority
shareholder. It is not serving its role as corporate conscience and acts like a
highly enfeebled governance mechanism that is powerless instead of
empowering.
This only goes to show that having independent directors on family
boards does not ipso facto solve all problems. If they do not perform their
fiduciary duties and responsibilities well, then their independence is subject
to question. Despite the advantages of more independent directors on a
board, it must also be remembered that such a prescription is not
automatically applicable or suitable to all businesses run by families. It has
been noted that “family business managers and consultants should realize
that increasing . . . the proportion of unaffiliated outsiders [on the board]
will not lead to improved performance under all conditions. It is important
to reflect on the contingent situation created by various aspects of family
involvement in the business.”302 As far as Viacom’s board is concerned,
due to the company’s sheer size and complexity, it is appropriate for it to
have a majority of independent directors. That said, however, the
independent directors ought to continuously and meticulously balance and
effectively advise “the grand old man,” Sumner Redstone.
300. Viacom,
Inc.,
Corporate
Governance
Guidelines,
http://www.viacom.com/investorrelations/Investor_Relations_Docs/Corporate_Governance
_Guidelines12-13-07.pdf (last visited May 2, 2008).
301. The situation on the Viacom board and the dominance of Sumner Redstone is
similar to many Chinese family businesses (“CFBs”). See Jennifer Chiang, Chinese Family
Business: Corporate Governance, Succession, and a New Generation of Asian Leaders 8
(Apr., 2009) (unpublished final paper, University of Pennsylvania Wharton Business
School) (analyzing issues arising due to paternalism in Chinese family run businesses).
“Most CFBs are still dominated by the founder-entrepreneur who reigns as the patriarch
over all aspects of the business. Decision-making is centered on the patriarch, and
leadership is directive and authoritative. Paternalism reinforces the organizational rigidity
and hierarchy of the family business system: the patriarch often dominates the boardroom at
the expense of minority shareholders. This is further compounded by the family’s innate
distrust of non-family outsiders. ‘There is reluctance to bring in professional managers
because this requires reaching outside the bonds of the family, where trust is low.’ As a
result, the majority of CFB boards are ‘rubber-stamp’ boards with no real monitoring
mechanism. Most of the directors are family insiders whose chief concern is the family
welfare, and not the rights of minority, non-family shareholders. This is a common
phenomenon not just in Chinese family businesses, but also prevalent in Korean familydominated chaebols.” Id.
302. See Corbetta & Salvato, supra note 13, at 132.
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The Model Independent Board: The Clemens Family Corporation

While the Viacom board may not be an ideal independent body, the
independent board of directors of the Clemens Family Corporation is. The
Clemens board, more famous for its subsidiary, Hatfield Quality Meats,
presently has a blend of outside and inside directors,303 with three insiders
and four independent directors. Of the three insiders, one is the CEO (Phil
Clemens), while the other two are family members who are not employed
by the company.304 Currently brimming with stewardship, the Clemens
Family Corporation and its board were not always pretty pictures to
observe.
In 1999, the board (then known as the board of Hatfield Quality
Meats, as the holding company Clemens Family Corporation was still to be
formed) was puzzled as to why the company was in a downward financial
spiral.305 Even their contributions to charity were going down.306 After
consulting with the board, Phil Clemens spearheaded a rapid, behindclosed-doors corporate upheaval that revitalized the entire company, but
also bred familial discord, albeit temporarily.307 With the help of a strategic
consultant, it was decided that a succession planning committee should
immediately be formed and given plenary powers.308 After three months of
deliberations, the resolutions of the committee were astounding and radical:
long-entrenched family directors and employees were asked not to return to
the company.309 The board, which was originally composed of ten family
representatives and two independents, was disbanded.310 It was also
decided that two family middle managers needed to gain outside
experience. The board of directors was heavily reconstituted with four old
family directors asked not to return; two thirty-five year family employees
were dismissed; a parent company known as Clemens Family Corporation
was created; and an Owners’ Advisory Council was established.311 Phil
Clemens, due to his competence and vision, was promoted to CEO and
Chairman of the Clemens Family Corporation.312 The blitzkrieg-like
change was unprecedented and caused a lot of suspicion, as well as a sense

303. Answers.com,
The
Clemens
Family
Corporation,
http://www.answers.com/topic/the-clemens-family-corporation (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
304. Interview with Phil Clemens, CEO & Chairman of The Clemens Family
Corporation (Apr. 24, 2008) (on file with author).
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
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of betrayal and jealousy.313 The board and management were later
successful in allaying fears through the proper timing of the release of
information, open communications with employees, and a spirited
education campaign.314
A company with a very humble foundation and deeply rooted in
values,315 the Clemens Family Corporation did not always have an
independent board.316 As of 1973, there was a majority of family members
as directors with just a handful of outsiders.317 These outsiders were
listened to at first, but their ideas were not implemented simply because of
a prevailing attitude that the “family members know better.”318 This
continued until the board was, as stated, completely revamped in 2000 by
including independent directors, purging the old timers, and selecting
family members who did not have managerial responsibilities, except for
the CEO.319 Part of the strategy was to create an Owners’ Advisory
Council whose main objective, other than to set owners’ expectations, was
to interview and recommend candidates for the Clemens board.320 The
board meets five times per year, has four standing committees, and is
subjected to annual review.321
In an interview with Phil Clemens, he stated that the typical family
business board in the United States is composed of all insiders.322 This is
due to the fact that the founder-owner and the board believe they already
know everything about the business, which is simply incorrect.323 He
pointed out that independent directors have a variety of tasks that cannot be
done by the very subjective founders or family members, such as serving as
balancers on the board, and interviewing for and selecting the next CEO.324
If family member-directors will pick the next CEO, they will certainly pick
their own son or in-law with little or no regard to their level of
competency.325 He also mentioned that it would be best to try to avoid

313. Id.
314. John L. Ward & Christina N. Goletz, Clemens Family Corporation (B): The
Process of Change, Kellogg Sch. Mgmnt KEL116, 2004, at 1-5.
315. The Clemens Family Corporation, http://www.clemensfamilycorp.com/ (last visited
May 3, 2008).
316. Interview with Phil Clemens, supra note 305.
317. Id.
318. Phil Clemens, CEO & Chairman of The Clemens Family Corporation, Presentation
on How to Instill Values in the Business at Wharton School’s Course on Strategies and
Practices of Family-Controlled Companies (Apr. 3, 2008) (on file with author).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Interview with Phil Clemens, supra note 305.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.

OSIFINAL_SIX

2009]

1/22/2010 5:14:57 PM

FAMILY BUSINESS GOVERNANCE

227

directors whose independence might be questionable (e.g., suppliers and
customers).326
Additionally, he recommended that generally (and depending on the
size of the board in question) family boards should at least have three
independent directors for balance.327 Independent directors are identified
and recruited through word-of-mouth, but the assistance of search firms
and the Family Firm Institute (FFI) is most laudable.328 What should be
guarded against, he noted, is whether the independent director really
exercised his independence and objectivity on vital board decisions.329 Did
he exercise his own judgment? Was it a credible independent decision, or
was he forced by the family to vote that way? Coercion and deception
should be avoided at all times.330 Directors also must not serve too long, as
they will easily become attached to personnel, become friends with the
CEO, and thus lose their independence.331 He asks: how can you vote
against the CEO when he has already become your friend and colleague?
Phil Clemens thus suggested that the minimum time to serve should be
three years (electable every year) and the maximum ought to be ten.332
This time period will leave a comfortable average of around seven years of
board service.333
Based on his own experience, independent directors who become
close friends with the CEO should resign.334 Phil Clemens resigned from
boards he served on in New Jersey and Florida simply because he could not
perform his role as monitor and conscience when he had become good
friends with the person he was supposed to oversee. He simply told these
boards he had to resign.335 For him, independent directors are fresh eyes,
eager individuals who see the bigger picture of the company and prescribe
workable solutions.336 Though independents may sometimes be viewed
with antagonism, management generally appreciates outside board
members because they know outsiders are going to be fair, as they do not
have ties with the business.337 It is also best, he mentioned, that
independent directors do not come from the same industry as the

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Presentation by Phil Clemens, supra note 319.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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corporation’s industry.338 He himself is a director in a successful flower
company and his thoughts and opinions are most valued.339 He similarly
postulated that it is hard for independent directors—in fact very dangerous-—to meddle into family problems and squabbles.340 “That simply isn’t
their duty.”341
There are times when independent directors can play mediating roles,
but the maintenance of family unity is not one of their chief functions.342
On the charge that independent directors do not know the business they are
asked to monitor, Clemens stated that independents are not tasked to know
every corner of the business.343 The nature of the job of an independent
director is to select the next CEO, provide insight from the outside, oversee
management, give a different yet fresh perspective, and present the bigger
picture objectively.344 It is not the nature of their job to interfere with the
day-to-day affairs or to know everything there is to know about the
company.345 His company’s criteria for independent directors are: (1)
currently a senior management individual from a successful business, with
preference for Presidents or CEOs; (2) strong financial background and
clearly understands the need and value of business metrics; (3)
unquestionable ethics and integrity; (4) embraces the visions, values, and
culture of the Clemens Family Corporation; and (5) proposed directors
shall not have a conflict of interest with any Clemens Family Corporation
business.346
V.

THE IDEAL FAMILY BUSINESS BOARD: BOARD SIZE, FREQUENCY OF
MEETINGS, AGENDA, PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING

It is difficult to pin down a perfect board size for most family-run
businesses. Several factors have to be considered. These factors would
include the size of the organization, the length of time it has been in
business, and its annual returns. A family company should typically have
five to eight directors347 (or seven to twelve directors for larger entities),
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. This statement of Phil Clemens in 2008 echoes a statement by one of the
independent directors interviewed by Schwartz & Barnes in 1991 who stated, “I shouldn’t
be involved in there [family dynamics.] It’s not my business, and I should be where I can be
more objective than they are.” Schwartz & Barnes, supra note 84, at 280.
342. Interview with Phil Clemens, supra note 305.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. The Clemens Family Corporation, Board of Directors Adopted 2001, available at
http://www.clemensfamilycorp.com/pages/board-of-directors.aspx.
347. Davis & Cormier, supra note 82, at 5.
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with a majority of independent directors. Insider directors should consist
of the CEO and a few family representatives who need not be employed in
the company or even be direct family members.
They can be
representatives elected by the shareholders, the family, or the family
council.348 In the long-run, due to possible tensions or conflicts of interest,
it may be better to avoid appointing as directors family members who are
going up in the corporate ladder. If an employed family member is already
a very senior manager and is seen as a potential successor, then it may be a
good idea to give that individual a directorial role so that the board can
assess his or her viability and leadership.
In terms of frequency of meeting, it will again depend on many
factors. As seen in the case of Vietri, Inc., its board had been meeting only
once per year,349 yet communication between the owner-managers and
board members was constant and open throughout the year.350 The Vietri
board assisted greatly with issues ranging from transition and succession, to
sibling rivalry.351 On the average, a family board should meet between four
to six times per year, with the agenda set up by the CEO in consultation
with the independent directors.352 More importantly, each meeting should
be “a virtual seminar in business administration and human dynamics, with
everyone present both teacher and student.”353
The independent directors, as stated above, should outnumber the
insiders and the grey directors. As is the case of the Clemens Family
Corporation, of the seven board members, only three are insiders (the CEO
Philip Clemens and two other non-executive family members), and four are
totally independent board directors.354 The ratio between insiders/grey and
independent directors need not reach the present dynamics of publicly-held
corporations, which stands at one to nine, with one insider director (the
CEO) and all the rest independents.355 A good 70:30 or 60:40 ratio of
independent directors to insider/grey directors would be a healthy
composition of a present-day family board.356 As much as possible,
348. Id.
349. This practice of meeting only once a year may have changed.
350. See Stone, supra note 106, at 5 (explaining how the sisters take advantage of the
board members’ expertise outside of the annual meeting).
351. Id.
352. Ellen Frankenberg, With Apologies to David Letterman: Ten Reasons Not to Create
an Advisory Board, FAM. BUS. MAG., Autumn 2003, at 2 (“A typical board agenda might
include (1) reviewing management’s implementation of the strategic plan, (2) comparing
last year’s financials with this year’s, (3) helping determine the feasibility of expanding into
a new region or product line, (4) discussing reports from department heads and (5)
developing criteria for selecting the next CEO.”).
353. Raymond, supra note 78, at 7.
354. Interview with Phil Clemens, supra note 305.
355. Id.
356. Id.
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however, grey directors—meaning the corporation’s service providers (e.g.
lawyers, accountants, bankers), CEO friends, business dealers and
suppliers, and other friends of family members (e.g. golf buddies of an
uncle in the business) —should be avoided.357 They are usually beholden
to the family or dominated by the CEO or a kin very close to him, and
therefore lack independence.358 They may eventually end up diminishing
the integrity of the board.
The family business board ought to schedule yearly planning meetings
or retreats.359 Business Planning, it must be recalled, is a very inclusive
activity.360 Thus, the business of the board need not be confined to formal
meetings or telephone conversations.
Camaraderie, interpersonal
communication, friendliness, candor, and familiness must permeate the
board in all of its activities. One of the better ways to achieve this is an
annual retreat which will discuss and program future plans.361 This will
help the board relax and get to know each other better, over and beyond
their impressions of each other in the boardroom.362 This can be done
every six months if time permits.363 According to John A. Davis and Keely
Cormier, family business boards should meet quarterly for a day or more
each time.364 Three of the four annual meetings should last one day, while
the fourth should be a live-in retreat between the management and board to
plan the following year’s programs.365
Board members should also have limits on their terms of office.
Directors should have a one to three year term limit, with reelection
permissible, and should be compensated based on prevailing market
norms.366 Neubauer and Lank advocate the suggestion by John Ward, who
stated that companies should pay directors per day for board services in a
manner similar to the “daily wage” of the owner-CEO (owner-CEO’s
yearly pay divided by 250 working days).367 The compensation to directors
should not be extravagant, but reasonable enough to incentivize attendance,

357. See Davis & Cormier, supra note 82, at 6 (noting how some CEOs have found their
companies to be most benefited by “unbiased, objective views from outside directors”).
358. See MILLER & BRETON-MILLER, supra note 3, at 219 (comparing the governance,
philosophy, and organization of winning family controlled businesses versus common
practices).
359. See Neubauer, supra note 70, at 2 (suggesting there should be a reasonable number
of board meetings per year as well as biannual retreats in places away from the business).
360. Id.
361. Davis & Cormier, supra note 82, at 3.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. NEUBAUER & LANK, supra note 169, at 124.
367. Id.
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and must include retainer, board, committee fees, and perquisites, if any.368
Also, a nominating committee ought to be responsible for screening and
selecting potential directorial candidates,369 with assistance from human
resources consultants or search firms.370 John A. Davis recommends that
family shareholders should not only understand board member
qualifications, but must likewise “participate, when useful, in the screening
of board members.”371 Board directors should not spread themselves too
thin by serving as directors in more boards than they can possibly handle
both physically and mentally.372 This practice is frowned upon by the
public and the business community.373 Directors should ideally serve on, at
most, three to four boards, the ceiling of which can be adjusted depending
on the director’s expertise, time availability, and lack of conflicting
interests, among other factors.374
Self-evaluation375 by the board should be part of its programming.376
Who is performing well, who is absent for no justifiable reason, and who is
not performing up to par are questions that must be answered and
addressed by the board if it is to be an effective governance structure.377
This will ensure that it is not made into a rubberstamp by the founder or
CEO.378 It will also check the egos of the board members as they may
think they are superbly performing when, in fact, they are not.
VI. CONCLUSION
The concept of a family-run business is eternal and will not wither
away. Families will be starting new entrepreneurships or continuing
businesses that have been handed down to them from the prior generations.
As such, it is good to continually explore its strengths and identify its
problem areas so that updated and relevant solutions are made. Family
businesses are very important in the economic fabric of any country. One
need not look too far: a third of Fortune 500 firms are owned by

368. Heidrick, supra note 197, at 276.
369. Joseph Astrachan, Andrew Keyt, Suzanne Lane, and Kristi McMillan, Fostering
Accountability in the Family Business Board, FAM. BUS. MAG., Winter 2007, at 3.
370. Davis et. al, supra note 152, at 8-9.
371. John A. Davis, Responsibilities & Rights of Family Shareholders of a Family
Business, HARV. BUS. SCH. 9-801-264, Jan. 2001, at 1.
372. JAMES F. REDA, STEWART REIFLER, & LAURA G. THATCHER, THE COMPENSATION
COMMITTEE HANDBOOK 72-3 (2007).
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. NEUBAUER & LANK, supra note 169, at 121-123.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
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families;379 family-controlled businesses account for over half of U.S.
employment and approximately 78% of new jobs created.380 Additionally,
80-90% of all businesses in North America are family-run enterprises
averaging fifty or so employees, and quite keenly, 39% of family-owned
businesses will change leadership in the next five years.381 Asian
businesses are predominantly family-owned enterprises, while in the
European Union, family firms comprise about 60-90% of all businesses,
depending on the country.382
To ensure that family-run businesses go past the first and second
generations, one of the key governance mechanisms is the institution of an
independent board. Consultants have argued that boards of directors must
not be the first line of attack and are advocating for an advisory board that
will eventually morph into a formal board of directors.383 There is truth and
pragmatism to this argument, but if the company is ready for a board and
the founder-CEO is enlightened that a well-chosen board is a “fountain of
knowledge,”384 then its constitution need not be delayed by years or
decades.
The foundation of an independent board is independent directors.385
Independent directors promote cohesion, provide perspective and
neutrality, and check and balance the founder-CEO. They serve to aid the
board in its decisions due to their expertise and years of serving as
corporate managers or CEOs. They can also act as mediators in case there
is a family conflict that is teetering on destroying the business, which they,
as a corporate conscience, cannot simply sit by idly while the founder, the
heir-apparent, and the family tear each other apart. Failure to decisively act
may lead to a violation of their fiduciary duties as directors, which means
that serving on the board is not risk-free but risk-laden. Hence, a strong
commitment to serve, mental fortitude, and educated evenhandedness are
critical.
It is true that “family and business cultures, which shape governance
systems, differ widely across geographical boundaries, as well as over time
and business life-cycle stages.”386 Essentially, this means that family

379. See MILLER & BRETON-MILLER, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that thirty-five percent of
S&P 500 companies as of 2003 are family-controlled businesses with the founding family
on board as executives or as very influential owners).
380. Id. at 2.
381. Stuart Diamond, Presentation on Family Business at a University of Pennsylvania
Law Course on Negotiations and Dispute Resolution (Nov. 29, 2007).
382. See LANDES, supra note 6, at xi (noting that “[i]n the European Union, family firms
make up 60-90 percent of businesses, depending on the country . . . .”).
383. Murdock, supra note 163, at 1-4.
384. Raymond, supra note 78, at 4.
385. Id.
386. Corbetta & Salvato, supra note 13, at 124.
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business governance varies from place to place and from time to time. This
also means that independent boards are relevant based on existing
circumstances of the family business. Though outside boards are not
mandatory for the survival and functioning of all family businesses in all
relevant stages of their life cycles, having one will increase the chances of
surviving well beyond the first and second generations.

